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THE COLOR OF PAIN: RACIAL BIAS IN PAIN
AND SUFFERING DAMAGES
Maytal Gilboa*

For more than half a century, our legal system has
formally eschewed race-based discrimination, and nearly
every field of law has evolved to increase protections for
minority groups historically burdened by racial prejudice.
Yet, even today, juries in tort actions routinely consider a
plaintiff’s race when calculating compensatory tort
damages, and they do so in a manner that systematically
results in lower awards to Black plaintiffs than to White.
This Article examines this problem, zeroing in on the
specific issue of racial bias in calculations of tort damages
for pain and suffering.
The severity of a plaintiff’s injury is commonly
considered the best indicator for measuring her pain and
suffering. In this Article, I argue that severity of injury is
also the loophole through which racial bias infiltrates the
calculation of these damages. Drawing on studies that
reveal medical providers’ tendency to view Black patients’
injuries as less severe than White patients’, I explain that
Black plaintiffs’ damages for pain and suffering are
susceptible to racial bias at two levels: first, when health
care providers underestimate their injuries, and second,
when jurors rely on the opinions of these providers—
which may confirm and amplify the jurors’ own implicit
biases—in deciding damages for pain and suffering.
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This Article argues that tort law currently has no
reliable mechanism for detecting and correcting implicit
biases that may inform jurors’ assessments of Black
plaintiffs’ pain and suffering. Failure to correct these
biases allows juries to undervalue Black plaintiffs’ pain
and suffering losses, leading to damages awards that are
inconsistent with the goals of tort law. In particular, I
explain that the systematic underestimation of Black
plaintiffs’ pain and suffering losses effectively lowers both
the cost of defendants’ tortious conduct toward Black
victims and the standard of care vis-à-vis those victims,
creating a severe problem of underdeterrence. Because
potential tortfeasors know that, on average, tortious
conduct towards White victims costs more than tortious
conduct towards Black victims, they will generally act
more cautiously around White people.
After exposing the problem of racial bias in pain and
suffering damages and exploring its serious implications,
this Article introduces a simple and easy-to-apply
mechanism for neutralizing the effect of implicit racial
bias in the calculation of pain and suffering damages:
Equalizing Ratio Tables (ERTs). ERTs quantify racebased discrepancies in the average damages awarded for
pain and suffering and can be used in several ways to
narrow, or even eliminate, these discrepancies and their
detrimental implications on Black plaintiffs.
Although this Article focuses on racial bias in pain and
suffering damages against Black plaintiffs, its discussion
may be relevant to understanding the implications of
other types of biases as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of racial discrepancies in damages awarded for loss of
life and limb is familiar. These damages compensate tort victims for
future economic loss, and they commonly1 reflect the use of racebased tables2 to predict a plaintiff’s future earning potential.3
Although both courts and scholars have sharply criticized racebased tables,4 they are frequently used to calculate the loss of future
income for plaintiffs with no established earnings record—in which

See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional
Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
325, 326 (2018) (referring to the use of race-based data as a “standard practice”).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1316 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d sub
nom. on other grounds United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005) (mentioning
the view that “including race and sex adjustments appears consistent with the approach
encouraged by some treatises, which suggest use of race and sex based statistics for
calculating lost income when a claimant has no established earnings record”); Powell v.
Parker, 303 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming race-based statistics for
calculating loss of income); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 527–28
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (same).
3 See, e.g., Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (“Using race and sex adjustments to calculate
lost income significantly reduces the awards that the victims would otherwise receive.”).
4 See, e.g., G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (“The use of race-based statistics to obtain a reduced damage award—which is now
extended to the use of ethnicity-based statistics, to calculate future economic loss—is
unconstitutional.”); McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Equal protection . . . demands that the claimant not be subjected to a disadvantageous life
expectancy estimate solely on the basis of a ‘racial’ classification.”); Yuracko & Avraham,
supra note 1, at 371–72 (arguing that reliance on race-based data to calculate tort damages
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ronen Avraham &
Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661, 666–67 (2017) (suggesting
that courts should stop using tables that factor race and gender into damages calculations
and should instead use “blended” tables—meaning tables “that do not delineate on racial or
gender lines”); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific
Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75
(1994) (“[T]he use of explicit race-based and gender-based economic data is
unconstitutional.”); MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 168 (2010) (“When courts award damages for loss of earning
capacity in tort litigation, they do more than passively pass on the market price of plaintiff’s
labor; they express a view about the future and should not be oblivious to their own role in
constructing that future.”).
1
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cases, the tables systematically produce lower awards for Black
plaintiffs than for White plaintiffs with the same injury.5
The focus of this Article, however, is on a different type of
damages, namely, damages for pain and suffering. Unlike economic
losses that result from physical injuries, pain and suffering cannot
be measured by reference to objective factors such as loss of income.6
Therefore, race-based tables or similar statistical data cannot
similarly explain evidence of racial discrepancies in pain and
suffering damages.7 I suggest that these discrepancies are the result
of implicit racial bias hiding in the shadows of the ambiguous
assessment of pain and suffering losses.
For decades, scholars have acknowledged that racial bias affects
the estimation of pain and suffering damages.8 But they have
typically considered this problem in the context of the

5 See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 669–77 (explaining how race- and gender-based
tables “infuse[] race and gender bias into damage calculations,” resulting in lower awards);
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 168–70 (criticizing courts’ usage of race and gender
to predict an individual’s future earning capacity); Chamallas, supra note 4, at 87 (surveying
studies on racially disparate impacts in damages awards).
6 See Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 58 (1990) (illustrating the significance of pain and suffering loss by asking
“whether you would be indifferent or even nearly indifferent between an uninjured state and
a severely injured state, such as paraplegia, blindness, or severe brain damage, so long as
your income and wealth remained constant”).
7 See Erik Girvan & Heather J. Marek, Psychological and Structural Bias in Civil Jury
Awards, 8 J. AGGRESSION, CONFLICT & PEACE RSCH. 247, 253 (2016) (finding, based on an
exploratory case analysis, that Black plaintiffs were awarded “41 percent of the amount of
pain and suffering damages as white plaintiffs”); Jonathan Cardi, Valerie P. Hans & Gregory
Parks, Do Black Injuries Matter?: Implicit Bias And Jury Decision Making in Tort Cases, 93
S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 550 (2020) (generally finding that “in [tort] suits against individual
defendants, black plaintiffs were awarded lower dollar damage awards than white plaintiffs”
in the authors’ study). For an argument that pain and suffering damages can also be
influenced by race-based tables to some extent, see Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 725.
8 See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 785 (1995)
(“The possibility that jurors rely on extralegal factors such as gender, race, socioeconomic
status, or physical appearance is a significant concern . . . .”); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors
Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 770 (1995) (noting that there
is “disturbing evidence that some jurors have been affected by the race of the litigants” and
calling for further investigation of the impact of race and gender in pain and suffering
awards).
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inconsistency,9 and thus unpredictability,10 of these damages.
Seeking a solution to these broader questions, many scholars have
developed thoughtful approaches to “measure the immeasurable”
and put a price on pain and suffering.11 This Article reviews the
prominent proposals for measuring pain and suffering damages,12
drawing attention to a common theme: the severity of the plaintiff’s
injury as a significant predictor of the amount of pain and suffering
damages.13 Indeed, the severity-of-injury inquiry has dominated
judicial determinations of pain and suffering damages as well.14
In this Article, I argue that the severity-of-injury inquiry is also
the loophole through which racial bias infiltrates the assessment of
9 See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 785 (“Even if jurors are not influenced by extralegal
factors, the lack of a well-defined method for calculating the award subjects it to the
appearance of unfairness.”); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and
Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 310 (1989) (noting that similarly situated
plaintiffs “are often awarded vastly differing amounts of [pain and suffering] damages” that
cannot be explained by the underlying facts in each case).
10 Cf. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 91 (2006)
(noting that many people perceive jury awards as “a lottery in which the outcome cannot be
predicted based on relevant case factors” and that some people attributed insurance and
products liability crises to jury awards of pain and suffering damages); Alan Schwartz,
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 411 (1988)
(arguing that “[c]ourts . . . should deny strict liability for nonpecuniary harm” in part because
“the risk of nonpecuniary harm is difficult . . . to predict and insure against”).
11 See Avraham, supra note 10, at 87 (describing finding a way to calculate pain and
damages as “a daunting task” of “put[ting] a price on the unpriceable”); Chase, supra note 8,
at 765 (“An inescapable reality of the pain and suffering conundrum is that tort law requires
the monetization of a ‘product’ for which there is no market and therefore no market price.”).
12 I review prominent proposals for estimating pain and suffering damages in Section III.A.,
infra.
13 See infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Binette v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-0731V, 2019 WL 1552620, at
*10 (Fed. Cl. Off. of the Special Masters Mar. 20, 2019) (“In determining an award for pain
and suffering and emotional distress, it is appropriate to consider the severity of injury and
awareness and duration of suffering.”); Easton v. Chevron Indus., Inc., 602 So. 2d 1032, 1038
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (“In assessing quantum for a decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, the
Court must consider both the severity and duration of the injury preceding death.” (citing
Bickham v. Airlie Corp., 468 So. 2d 658, 661 (La. Ct. App. 1985))); Graves v. Sec’y of the Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579, 589 (2013) (stating that “severity of injury,
awareness, and duration of the suffering” are the factors for assessing compensation in pain
and suffering cases); Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2001)
(enumerating various aspects of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering loss to determine its level
of severity).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss2/4

6

Gilboa: The Color of Pain

2022]

THE COLOR OF PAIN

657

pain and suffering damages. The severity-of-injury inquiry is
extremely susceptible to racial bias, especially when applied to the
pain and suffering of Black victims. Research indicates that many
White laypeople, and even trained healthcare providers,
underestimate the severity of Black people’s injuries.15 The roots of
this bias derive from myths that accord Black people higher
resistance to pain and physically stronger bodies than White
people.16 Although these stereotypes might seem benevolent, they
dehumanize Black people17 and have numerous detrimental
implications. The implication that concerns this Article is that
Black plaintiffs are, on average, under-compensated for their pain
and suffering losses. The Article identifies the twofold bias that
explains this result. The first comes from biased judgments of
healthcare providers who, research shows, often underestimate the
severity of Black patients’ medical conditions.18 The second comes
from biased jurors who may also view Black plaintiffs’ injuries as
less severe than White plaintiffs’ and whose biases are confirmed
and amplified (unbeknownst to them) by medical evidence that
purports to be objective but is tainted with bias.19 Importantly, as
this Article explains, biased judgements usually result from implicit
bias,20 meaning that the healthcare professionals and jurors are
See infra notes 124–127, 145–153 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
17 Adam Waytz, Kelly Marie Hoffman & Sophie Trawalter, A Superhumanization Bias in
Whites’ Perceptions of Blacks, 6 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 352, 352–53 (2015) (“Work
on moral typecasting shows that perceiving humans and nonhuman entities to have advanced
capacities for agency reduces perceptions of these figures (compared to entities perceived to
lack agency) as capable of experiencing pain.”) (citations omitted)); id. at 353 (“[I]f people see
Blacks as superhuman, they may . . . perceive Blacks as less capable than Whites of feeling
pain.”).
18 See infra Section III.B.2.
19 See infra Section III.B.1.
20 Social scientists define implicit bias as a cognitive state in which people express
stereotypes without conscious awareness. See, e.g., Anona Su, A Proposal to Properly Address
Implicit Bias in the Jury, 31 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 81 (2020) (“Implicit bias is a
phenomenon coined . . . to describe the stereotypes our brains have built to help us navigate
the world. These implicit biases are something that humans generally do not realize exist
and [are] outside of their control.”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012) (defining implicit biases as “attitudes and stereotypes that
are not consciously accessible through introspection”); see also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS,
supra note 4, at 8 (“As [legal actors] operate in institutional contexts, common forms of
cognitive bias—particularly habits of thought that make it harder to imagine different
15
16
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unaware of the influence of bias on their estimation of a Black
person’s injury.
Racial discrepancies in pain and suffering damages affront both
the fundamental principles of our justice system and the concrete
goals of tort law. This Article focuses on the latter, revealing a
uniquely confounding problem of underdeterrence resulting from
the combination of elusive and unintentional bias with the
inherently indeterminate nature of pain and suffering. Unaware of
their bias, jurors not only may mistakenly underestimate a Black
plaintiff’s pain and suffering but also may unintentionally set a
lower standard of care for potential tortfeasors in their interactions
with Black victims as compared to White victims.21 In light of the
immeasurable nature of pain and suffering, detecting judicial errors
in awarding damages or setting the standard of care properly is
almost impossible in this type of loss. Potential tortfeasors who
know, even subconsciously, that on average their negligent conduct
towards White victims costs them more than the same conduct
towards Black victims will rationally tend to act more carefully
when they are around White people. In addition to this problem,
racial discrepancies in pain and suffering damages are at odds with
both the concept of global fairness, which demands similar
compensation for similarly severe injuries,22 and the core principle
of corrective justice, which requires a defendant’s liability to be
correlated to the foreseeable risk inflicted on the plaintiff.23
outcomes—can affect expectations about what is normal and reasonable and therefore
ultimately impact legal liability.”). The evidence on implicit bias has been contested. See,
e.g., Frederick L. Oswald, Hart Blanton, Gregory Mitchell, James Jaccard & Philip E.
Tetlock, Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion
Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 171, 173 (2013) (expressing skepticism on
introductory findings of Implicit Association Tests (IAT) calling for a new meta-analysis of
the IAT criterion to better understand the relation between implicit and explicit biases and
discriminatory behavior).
21 See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 10, at 88 n.3 (defining global fairness as the idea that “like
cases should be treated alike”); CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 163 (describing the
concept of universal justice manifested in compensatory damages in different legal systems).
23 Under this correlativity requirement, liability should be imposed when the risk that
defined the injurer’s conduct as negligent materializes as harm for the victim. See, e.g.,
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 159 (1995) (“The consequences for which the
defendant is liable are restricted to those within the risks that render the act wrongful in the
first place.”).
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After examining the contours of this problem, this Article
introduces a possible solution—namely, the use of a tool that I term
Equalizing Ratio Tables (ERTs)—which provides a vehicle for
educating jurors and judges about racial bias in pain and suffering
damages as well as an effective remedial method for eliminating
race-based inequities.24
This Article makes four important contributions. First, it
responds to recent calls to investigate implicit racial bias in tort
litigation, a realm in which the research about unconscious
prejudice is still in its early stages as compared to other areas like
criminal law and employment law.25 Second, the Article reveals a
severe problem of underdeterrence resulting from the unique
combination of unconscious bias and the open-ended nature of pain
and suffering loss. Third, the Article explains why the current
proposals for measuring pain and suffering losses fail to eliminate
racial bias and how they instead provide a safe place for racial bias
to hide. Last, the Article provides effective and easy-to-apply
methods to contend with the problem of racial bias in pain and
suffering damages and explains how they comply with the goals of
tort law.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II delineates the problem of
racial bias in pain and suffering damages in light of tort law’s goals.
Part III explains why the current proposals for calculating pain and
suffering damages cannot properly address this problem. Part IV
introduces my proposed solution. The conclusion then summarizes
the discussion.
See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
See Cardi et al., supra note 7, at 509 (“[T]he body of research on race and racism in tort
cases remains surprisingly thin. Much of the previous work on race and the law, including
implicit racial bias, has focused on criminal law and trials. . . . By comparison, tort law has
received much less attention.”); Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 1, at 329 n.15 (noting that
only a small number of torts and remedies casebooks mention the role of race and gender in
damage calculations); CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 1 (“Despite its social
importance, the topic of the significance of race and gender in the law of torts has not received
sustained attention largely because, on its surface, the world of torts appears divided between
those who suffer injury and those who inflict injury, categories that are race and gender
neutral.”); see also Mikah K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward an Open Discussion of Racial
Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1307 (calling for more solutions
to solve the problem of racial bias in the justice system and noting that “each scholar,
researcher, jurist, and attorney must stand on the shoulders of the ones who came before
them, hoping that they are able to place a brick in the wall of justice”).
24
25
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II. DELINEATING THE PROBLEM
A. IMPLICIT BIAS HIDDEN IN THE FOLDS OF AMBIGUOUS LOSS
ESTIMATION

Pain and suffering damages are possibly the purest indicator of
the influence of racial bias in tort law. Whereas loss of life and limb
can be converted relatively easily into monetary terms by
estimating loss of income, emotional losses require measurement of
the immeasurable by “putting a price” on a person’s pain.26 Indeed,
pain presents a different kind of loss. On the one hand, it is
amorphous in nature and thus difficult to demonstrate or to prove.27
On the other hand, it has very real implications on the sufferer’s
life,28 no less than loss of income.29 The ambiguous nature of pain
and suffering losses renders their estimation obscure as well.30 This,
in turn, has led to criticism that damages intended to compensate
for pain and suffering losses are unpredictable31 and potentially

See supra note 11.
See, e.g., I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9
(Fed. Cl. Off. of the Special Masters May 14, 2013) (“Awards for emotional distress are
inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a mathematical formula.”);
Muenstermann ex rel. Muenstermann v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 499, 527 (D. Md. 1992)
(“The full extent of nonpecuniary damages is difficult to measure. The amorphous nature of
the subject and the infinite variables that come into play make it impossible for courts to
fashion any precise rule.”).
28 See Avraham, supra note 10, at 88 (describing the view that “pain-and-suffering damages
actually compensate for a concrete loss: disfigurement, emotional trauma, extended physical
discomfort, and loss of normal life-enhancing capacities”).
29 Id. Moreover, “emotional costs” may also result in physical symptoms. See, e.g., W. PAGE
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 56 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“[M]edical science has recognized long
since that not only fright and shock, but also grief, anxiety, rage and shame, are in themselves
‘physical’ injuries, in the sense that they produce well marked changes in the body, and
symptoms that are readily visible to the professional eye.”).
30 Cf. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1345–46 (1995)
(contending that due to the open-ended nature of pain and suffering evaluations, “legal
scholars and others should pay more attention to cognitive effects on pain and suffering
damages, so that society can respond more actively to choices made under the influence of
cognitive tendencies”).
31 See supra note 10.
26
27
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excessive.32 Some commentators have even called for abolishing
these damages.33 Over the years, this criticism has yielded state tort
law reforms, typically in the form of some cap on noneconomic
damages.34 Nevertheless, pain and suffering damages continue to
make up a significant part of total compensatory awards,35 and
scholars have called for the repeal of reforms limiting them.36
Accordingly, the investigation of racial disparities in these damages
remains relevant and essential.

32 See, e.g., CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 178 (“The main thrust of the tort
reformers’ general critique of noneconomic damages is that noneconomic damages are
excessive and unpredictable.”); John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of
Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 385 (1992) (maintaining
that courts tend to overestimate the risk for pain and suffering loss because “judicial focus on
the occurrence of an untoward event can obscure the smallness of the ex ante probability that
the event would occur”). But see Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets
Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J.
217, 255, 262–64 (1993) (discussing empirical results that contest the hypothesis that jurors
award excessive amounts for pain and suffering when the defendants have “deep pockets”).
33 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals
of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 201 (2004) (suggesting that noneconomic damages for pain
and suffering should no longer be recoverable in any personal injury torts claims and that
prevailing plaintiffs in such claims should be awarded enhanced economic damages and
reasonable attorney’s fees instead); JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NOFAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 10, 97 (1975) (calling for the establishment
of elective no-fault liability and explaining that under a no-fault liability scheme, insurance
companies would only pay for an insured’s out-of-pocket costs, rather than for pain and
suffering damages).
34 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2022) (“In no action shall the amount of
damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 766.118(2) (West 2022) (limiting noneconomic loss resulting from medical
malpractice to $1 million, excluding cases of permanent vegetative state or death). For
updated data on states’ tort law reforms, see RONEN AVRAHAM, DATABASE OF STATE TORT
LAW REFORMS (7th ed. 2021) (tracking prevalent tort reforms in the United States from 1980
to 2020 and recording data on all tort law reforms in every state).
35 Avraham, supra note 10, at 87 (“Pain-and-suffering awards seem to continue to make up
approximately fifty percent of total awards, at least in some areas of personal injury cases.”);
Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 777 (“At present, pain-and-suffering damages account for about
half of the total tort damages paid in products liability and medical malpractice cases.”); see
also John Campbell, Bernard Chao & Christopher Robertson, Time Is Money: An Empirical
Assessment of Non-Economic Damages Arguments, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2017)
(emphasizing the importance of non-economic damages).
36 For a profound review of the arguments against the reforms limiting pain and suffering
damages, see CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 170–82.
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The ambiguous nature of pain and suffering losses makes them
not only difficult to measure but also an ideal place for racial bias
to linger undetected. Indeed, the effects of any bias are much more
difficult to observe in open-ended assessments.37 This is especially
true when it comes to implicit bias. While the legal system has made
notable progress in eliminating explicit or conscious bias,38 only
limited steps have been taken to confront the more difficult
challenge of eliminating the effects of implicit bias.39
Social scientists define implicit bias as a cognitive phenomenon
in which people consciously reject certain stereotypes or preferences
but express them without conscious intent.40 Thus, one may deny,
even to oneself, that she holds prejudiced beliefs, while at the same
time she is influenced by such beliefs when wearing a juror’s hat.41
Unawareness and denial make the elimination of implicit bias in
the courtroom a difficult task, even with respect to tangible
damages.42 The task becomes almost impossible when it comes to
pain and suffering damages, which compensate for losses that are
themselves intangible and difficult to define.
B. THE GOALS OF TORT LAW

Undercompensating minorities for their pain and suffering
undermines three dominant goals of tort law: global fairness,
deterrence, and corrective justice. In this section, I address each of
37 See, e.g., Girvan & Marek, supra note 7, at 248–49 (connecting the racial discrepancies
in pain and suffering damages to the psychological intuition that “ambiguity and discretion
facilitate discrimination”); Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 785 (referring to studies showing that
“extralegal factors such as” race and gender are “more influential in jury decision-making
when the legal standards are the most” obscure).
38 See Su, supra note 20, at 79–80 (“[A]lthough not all explicit biases have been eliminated
in the courts, they are now no longer at the forefront of issues that courts address since many
mechanisms have been put in place to prevent such issues.” (footnote omitted)).
39 See id. at 80 (describing steps taken by courts to address implicit bias as “limited” and
“rang[ing] across the board”).
40 See supra note 20.
41 See id. at 90 (theorizing that a potential jury instruction on implicit bias would not yield
its intended result because it would not have a “great effect on how jurors may take their
implicit biases into consideration when reanalyzing the evidence”).
42 Cf. id. at 89–91 (explaining that the influence of implicit bias remains even when detailed
implicit-bias jury instructions are used due to jurors’ lack of prior knowledge and the
difficultly of applying knowledge of implicit bias to their own decision-making).
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these aspects, starting with considerations of global fairness,43 and
in particular, the idea that similarly situated plaintiffs ought to be
treated alike.44 This concept is also referred to as “horizontal
equity,”45 or the idea of fairness-as-equality.46
As explained above, because pain and suffering are amorphous
and harder to estimate with objective measures such as loss of
income,47 racial discrepancies in these damages are more difficult to
detect and redress. Yet, a reality in which two plaintiffs with
identical injuries are compensated differently for their pain and
suffering based on arbitrary considerations such as race or gender
cannot be squared with the concept of fairness as equality, which
requires that like cases be treated alike.48
Implicit bias in pain and suffering damages also compromises a
second critical goal of tort law: deterrence. To appreciate the
uniquely severe problem of underdeterrence that results from
undetected racial bias in pain and suffering damages,49 consider the
following hypothetical involving medical malpractice. Assume that
a physician creates a foreseeable harm of severe trauma and anxiety
to a plaintiff by mistakenly diagnosing her with terminal cancer
while she is in fact healthy.50 For simplicity, assume that the patient
See supra note 22.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text; Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James
F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering”, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 908, 924 (1989) (explaining that “fundamental fairness requires similarly situated
parties to be treated in a similar fashion by the legal system”); CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS,
supra note 4, at 163 (summarizing how some courts have opted to ensure equality among
similarly situated plaintiffs regardless of their race and gender).
45 Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 784. I will later explain that the definition of horizontal equity
does not necessarily reflect the most prominent problem resulting from implicit bias. See infra
Section III.B.
46 Avraham, supra note 10, at 101.
47 See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
48 Cf. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 162 (“[T]he contemporary reliance on
gender- and race-based tables amounts to an updated version of the old discriminatory
practice.”).
49 See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 786 (“[T]he element of arbitrariness and resultant
unpredictability of pain-and-suffering awards undermine the deterrence function of the tort
system . . . .”).
50 For examples of such diagnostic errors, see In re Flood v. Pendleton Mem’l Methodist
Hosp., 989 So. 2d 809, 811–12, 816 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming pain and suffering damages
awarded by the trial court to the plaintiff who was misdiagnosed with Stage IV terminal bone
cancer and later discovered that his diagnosis was based on a different patient’s bone scan);
43
44
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does not endure any physical harm as a result.51 Assume further
that if the patient is White, her expected harm is estimated at 10,
whereas if the patient is Black, the same harm is estimated at 6.
Finally, assume that the physician can reduce the risk of harm to 0
by taking precautions that would cost her 7.
To address the implications of the hypothetical, two basic rules
should be taken into account: first, the rule of negligence, according
to which the physician’s behavior would amount to negligence if the
costs of precautions are lower than the expected harm;52 and second,
the prevailing law, under which a physician’s conduct is governed
by the same standard of care regardless of whether she treats a
White patient or a Black patient.53
Given these two basic rules, the hypothetical above demonstrates
a legal phenomenon termed “misalignment,” in which the expected
harm that sets the standard of care is different from the expected
harm for which liability is imposed and damages are awarded.54 In

Monroe v. State, No. 2012 CA 1683, 2013 WL 1791022, at *2 (La. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2013)
(affirming the trial court’s decision to award damages to a plaintiff who was erroneously
diagnosed with breast cancer and had her left breast removed needlessly, while also
addressing the plaintiff’s pain and suffering resulting from the diagnostic error).
51 For example, assume the patient did not get a treatment for the cancer, which might
have caused harmful physical consequences.
52 The standard of care is generally determined by the formula first articulated by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1947).
According to this formula, liability in negligence should be determined based on the relation
between investment in precaution (B) and the product of the probability (P) and magnitude
(L) of harm resulting from the accident. Id. If PL exceeds B, then the defendant should be
liable in negligence. Id. Conversely, if B equals or exceeds PL, then the defendant should not
be held liable. Id. The formula was later endorsed by courts and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010)
(suggesting a risk–benefit balancing test to assess negligence, substantially similar to the
Learned Hand formula, whereby the benefit is the advantage that the defendant gains if he
or she refrains from taking precautions, and when the costs of precautions exceed this benefit,
the defendant should be held liable in negligence).
53 See supra note 4; cf. Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 85–86
(2011) (“I could not find a single court decision suggesting that . . . a doctor would be required
under negligence law to take better care of a high-income patient than a low-income
patient . . . .”).
54 See Porat, supra note 53, at 84–85 (“In cases of misalignment, the risks that are
accounted for in setting the standard of care are different from the risks for which liability is
imposed and damages are awarded.”).
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the hypothetical, the standard of care should be set at 1055
regardless of whether it applies to a Black or a White patient. Even
assuming, however, that the jury applies the same standard of care
for Black and White patients, and that the physician knows she will
be held liable for negligence that causes her patients harm,56 she
will have no incentive to take precautions that cost her 7 when
liability will cost her only 6, as in the Black patient’s case. By
contrast, she will be induced to take precautions costing her 7 to
prevent liability that would cost her 10 in the White patient’s case.57
The outcome for the Black patient in our hypothetical is even
worse if we assume that jurors may be implicitly biased and thus
unaware that they are underestimating the Black patient’s harm.
Because the standard of care is generally set according to the
expected harm,58 the standard of care is set higher for injuries that
are evaluated as more costly than for injuries evaluated as less
costly.59 Therefore, when jurors unconsciously assess a Black
plaintiff’s injury at 6—and a White plaintiff’s injury resulting from
the same conduct at 10—they may also implicitly lower the
standard of care in the Black plaintiff’s case, setting it at 6.60 Recall
55 The standard of care is set according to the expected harm. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182–89 (2004) (explaining that the duty of care
reflects the expected losses resulting from the accident); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972) (explaining the connection between the
expected harm and the precautions that would avert it).
56 Because 10 is greater than 7, the Hand Formula, supra note 52, would not impose
liability on the doctor.
57 See Porat, supra note 53, at 107 (“[W]hile the standard of care is the same for all victims,
the higher compensation awarded to high-income victims leads injurers to be more cautious
toward this group after all.”). A similar concern of misalignment is mentioned in the literature
about the practice of using race-based tables to calculate tort damages for loss of life and limb
when the plaintiff’s injury is assessed in terms of loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity.
See, e.g., Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 1, at 327 (“The use of race-based tables creates an
incentive for companies to disproportionately allocate risks to minority communities in order
to minimize potential tort damages in the future.”).
58 See supra note 55.
59 See Porat, supra note 53, at 86–87 (discussing accidents involving loss of income and
noting that in light of courts’ longstanding practice regarding the standard of care, “it seems
that potential injurers should take greater care toward the rich than the poor, just as they
should be more careful in their interactions with high-value property”).
60 This is especially true in cases of pure nonmonetary losses when the plaintiff does not
suffer from any physical harm. But even when physical harm accompanies pain and suffering
loss, it would be very difficult (if at all possible) to find out whether the jurors mistakenly
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that the cost of precautions in our hypothetical is 7. As this simple
numerical illustration shows, implicitly biased jurors applying
disparate standards of care would therefore find that the physician
met her duty of care to the Black plaintiff and would not hold her
liable for negligence,61 while they would find that she violated her
duty of care with respect to the White plaintiff and would hold her
liable for negligence.
Thus, although the law ostensibly requires the same levels of
care toward White and Black patients, the physician in our
hypothetical knows—despite the purest of intentions—that she is
less likely to incur liability for negligence toward Black patients
than toward White patients. As a result, the gap between the
expected cost of harm to Black and to White patients is even greater.
Under these conditions, the physician is incentivized (likely
unconsciously) to act more cautiously toward White patients than
toward Black patients.62 In this scenario, Black patients are
potentially disadvantaged at three junctures: first, when the
physician exercises less caution in her medical treatment; second,
when the jury applies a lower standard of care to the physician’s
conduct (making it less likely that the physician will be held liable
for negligence); and third, when the jury applies the appropriate
standard of care and holds the physician liable but awards damages
in an amount that underestimates the plaintiff’s loss.
It should be noted that the pattern of comparatively lower
damage awards for Black plaintiffs places the Black patient in our
hypothetical at a further disadvantage even before her case is filed.
Minority plaintiffs who are, on average, more likely to struggle to
pay hourly fees and therefore more often utilize contingency-fee
applied different standards of care on the two types of harm even though they derive from
the same negligence.
61 This outcome would follow if in the Black patient-plaintiff’s case, the jurors mistakenly
interpreted the standard of care as requiring the physician to take precautions at a cost lower
than 6.
62 Cf. Porat, supra note 53, at 98 (explaining that because courts will award, on average, a
greater amount in damages to victims from rich neighborhoods than to victims from poor
neighborhoods, drivers are incentivized to be more careful when driving in a rich
neighborhood); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 97, 137 (2019) (“[T]he inability of poor tenants to access the
legal system means that landlords have the fewest incentives to maintain safe conditions in
poor people’s homes.”).
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payments, might find an attorney who agrees to take their case.63
Attorneys who work on contingency bases, however, select cases
according to their expected damages and chances of winning.64
Damages for loss of life and limb usually constitute a substantial
part of plaintiffs’ compensation.65 These damages are computed
based on loss of income,66 and minorities whose earning capacity is,
on average, lower than that of Whites’, are expected to have a lower
damages amount,67 which then translates to expected lower
contingency fees for their lawyers.68 The Black patient in our
hypothetical might therefore struggle more to find a lawyer who
agrees to take her case than a White patient in similar
circumstances.69

63 See, e.g., Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900–1949, 49 HOW.
L.J. 99, 107 (2005) (“Many black clients, such as in the cases discussed in this Article, could
not have paid a lawyer’s hourly fee or advanced litigation expenses, but were able to bring
tort suits. The fact that these suits were brought at all is in part a story of the success of
contingency fee agreements.”).
64 See, e.g., id. (“Lawyers who work on a contingency basis have incentives to select and
aggressively pursue cases for which their clients are likely to win on liability and recover
significant damages, whatever the race of the injured person.”); Sabbeth, supra note 62, at
121 (“Contingency arrangements supply lawyers in cases that have a reasonable probability
of success and damages high enough to make the pursuit worthwhile when factoring in the
time and expenses of the litigation.”).
65 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 4, at 75 (1994) (noting that that loss of future earning
capacity is “frequently a sizable component of a damage award”). This is especially true due
to the caps typically applied on noneconomic damages. See infra notes 83–84 and
accompanying text.
66 See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 79 (“[L]oss of future earning capacity compensates for
the loss of ability to earn money, for the fact that the accident impaired plaintiff’s (or
decedent’s) earning power.”).
67 See id. at 75 (“The use of [race- and gender-based tables for calculating damages] allows
discrimination in one area—the setting of pay rates—to influence valuations in another
area—the calculation of personal injury awards.”); see also supra notes 4–6 and accompanying
text.
68 See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1574
(2005) (“Litigation in federal and state courts requires time, and time costs attorneys money.
Consequently, plaintiffs’ lawyers have less economic incentive to take employment claims
from low-wage employees.”).
69 Cf. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 178 (raising a similar argument when
discussing the influence of caps on pain and suffering damages, Chamallas and Wriggins note
that “in the same way that caps make it harder for elderly victims in nursing homes to find
lawyers to take their cases, the racial impact of caps likely surfaces even before cases are
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Importantly, the analysis here does not deny the possibilities
that two individuals might experience different levels of pain or that
similar circumstances might produce different emotional reactions
in different people. It is possible that the individual Black patient
in our hypothetical would experience either a lower or a higher level
of trauma and anxiety than the individual White patient. The
problem here, however, is that people other than the patient herself
may assign to her a lower level of pain and suffering based on racial
stereotypes, rather than on her individual characteristics. When
this error occurs systematically toward a particular minority
group,70 and in particular toward one that people most often identify
by appearance,71 a severe problem of underdeterrence may arise.72
Last, the hypothetical above also demonstrates how
undercompensating minority plaintiffs for their pain and suffering73
undermines corrective justice. The theory of corrective justice views
damages as a form of restoration needed to undo the injustice that
the defendant’s wrongful behavior inflicted on the plaintiff.74 Put
filed, settled, or tried”); Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 4, at 690 (“The caps on noneconomic
damages greatly limit the overall recoveries of women and minorities, thus making it less
likely for them to find a lawyer who will take on their case at all, as lawyers in that field work
on a contingency fee basis.”).
70 See, e.g., James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 237,
256 (1996) (describing prejudice as “negative evaluations of group members”).
71 See, e.g., Cynthia Feliciano, Shades of Race: How Phenotype and Observer Characteristics
Shape Racial Classification, 60 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 390, 394, 401 (2016) (observing that
“phenotypic differences are often employed in most definitions of race,” and “of all the
phenotypic characteristics, skin color is the most robustly significant and of the largest
magnitude in predicting who is classified as White, Black, or Latino”).
72 Cf. Porat, supra note 53, at 104 (explaining that a problem of underdeterrence is
especially problematic “when the typical potential victim can be clearly identified in advance
by the injurer, and adapting the level of care toward him by the injurer is practical”). The
physicians’ error of judgment concerning the estimation of the severeness of their Black
patients’ injuries is particularly troublesome because this type of error is associated with the
patients’ appearance. It is their identification as “Black” that enables physicians who hold
bias (even if unconsciously) to make this error of underestimating their pain.
73 See Girvan & Marek, supra note 7, at 253 (“[H]olding the other variables constant, jurors
tend to award black plaintiffs approximately 41 percent of the amount of pain and suffering
damages as white plaintiffs, controlling for the other predictors.”); Cardi et al., supra note 7,
at 550 (“[I]n suits against individual defendants, black plaintiffs were awarded lower dollar
damage awards than white plaintiffs [in the authors’ experiment].”).
74 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 84 (2012) (“Corrective justice integrates the
injustice and its rectification by construing the latter as undoing the former.”).
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differently, damages are required to make the plaintiff whole
again.75 To realize this restorative function of tort law,
compensatory damages cover a wide variety of injuries, including
pain and suffering losses.76 Assuming in the hypothetical above that
a Black patient and a White patient suffer the same level of trauma
and anxiety as a result of the physician’s diagnostic error, the injury
is the same, and both should be entitled to the same amount of
damages.
Recall that although racial bias in any type of damages is a
problem that must be addressed, it is especially insidious in the
nebulous paradigm of pain and suffering damages where errors in
assessing damages and setting the standard of care are much
harder to uncover and correct. This makes pain and suffering
damages a place where racial bias can flourish undetected.
The potential adverse effects of hidden racial bias (as well as
other biases) on pain and suffering damages have not gone
unnoticed.77 In the next Part, I address some of the prominent
solutions suggested in the literature to contend with this issue and
then explain why they fall short.

75 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137 (1935) (“[D]amages
for a tort should place the injured person as nearly as possible in the condition he would have
occupied if the wrong had not occurred . . . .”); see, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 74, at 118
(“Because corrective justice views damages as undoing an injustice, it is particularly sensitive
to the connection between the remedy that the plaintiff can claim and the injustice that is
imputed to the defendant.”); JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 371–73 (1992) (“If it is to
implement corrective justice, tort law must impose liability on that individual who has the
duty in corrective justice to make good the victim’s loss.”). Naturally, damages can only make
the plaintiff whole again in the normative sense because a monetary award cannot literally
restore the plaintiff to his or her pre-accident state.
76 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 157 (noting the inclusion of noneconomic
damages as a form of compensable loss). For a view of corrective justice that is suspicious of
the idea of damages for non-pecuniary losses, see, for example, Bruce Chapman, Wrongdoing,
Welfare, and Damages: Recovery for Non-Pecuniary Loss in Corrective Justice, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 409 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). Chapman
concludes that a monetary remedy for non-pecuniary loss increases the plaintiff’s welfare in
a way that is “irrelevant to the defendant’s wrongdoing” and that in such cases only nominal
damages should be available to the plaintiff. Id. at 425.
77 See supra note 8.
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III. SEVERITY OF INJURY: THE LOOPHOLE FOR RACIAL BIAS
A. CALCULATING PAIN

Scholars typically identify the potential effects of racial bias on
pain and suffering damages as part of the greater issue of lack of
consistency in these damages,78 which, in turn, imperils not only
their predictability,79 but also the goal of “horizontal equity.”80 In
response, many scholars have proposed approaches to calculating
pain and suffering damages in ways that would improve
consistency. In this section, I briefly present some of these
proposals. Importantly, my purpose here is not to offer a complete
survey of the different approaches to calculating pain and suffering
damages,81 but rather to draw attention to the common idea
underlying these proposals, namely the view that the severity of
injury is the best proxy for valuing a plaintiff’s pain and suffering.82
The first approach I address, which has been adopted by many
states,83 sets a cap on the amount of damages available for pain and
suffering. Caps purport to limit damages in order to improve their
predictability and prevent the possibility of excessively high
awards.84 Scholars have criticized the cap policy because, inter alia,
it leaves people with extremely severe injuries undercompensated85
and creates obstacles for those low-income people who can only pay
lawyers by contingency fees86 to find a lawyer who agrees to take

See supra note 9.
See supra note 10.
80 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
81 For a profound survey of the prominent approaches to computing pain and suffering
damages, see, for example, Avraham, supra note 10, at 90–97.
82 See infra note 103.
83 See supra note 34.
84 See Avraham, supra note 10, at 97 (“Under . . . a [capping] legal regime, lawyers and
insurers would have better knowledge of the range of possible awards and the extent of
unpredictability would be reduced.”).
85 This lack of adequate compensation, in turn, leads to a severe problem of
underdeterrence whereby potential tortfeasors have “no incentive to invest more in avoiding
more severe injuries because” they know that their liability for such injuries will be limited.
Id. at 98–99.
86 See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
78
79
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their case.87 For present purposes, however, it is particularly
important to address the cap policy’s absence of any organizing idea
to confront the potential inconsistency of pain and suffering
damages within the range that falls below the cap.88 Under the cap
policy, jurors are left with the daunting task of evaluating the
plaintiff’s pain and suffering damages, subject only to an upper
limit.89 In this task, the severity of the plaintiff’s injury is generally
the guidepost offered for jurors.90
A different approach to contending with the difficult task of
assessing pain and suffering damages proposes to supplement the
tort system with structured methods of calculation, such as
schedules and matrices.91 Schedules (binding or non-binding)
provide jurors with evidence of prior pain and suffering awards in
similar cases.92 The jurors thus can choose the right estimation of
87 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 177–78 (“Because caps on noneconomic
damages reduce plaintiffs’ recoveries, lawyers are less likely to represent . . . low-income
plaintiffs when a contingency fee is the only avenue for attorney compensation.”); see also
Avraham, supra note 10, at 99 (observing that “low-income people, especially the
unemployed . . . whose loss-of-income component in the total damage awards is null, might
be left severely injured without adequate means of survivorship”).
88 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 957–58 (noting that the “arbitrary limits” on jury caps
“fail to address any undervaluation or overvaluation below the ceiling”).
89 Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 790 (observing that capping damages does not resolve the core
problem of helping juries determine the appropriate award).
90 Id. at 839 (observing that “injury severity” constitutes “the sole piece of evidence that
juries are told to consider”).
91 For a profound review of this approach, see, for example, Avraham, supra note 10, at
101–06.
92 See, e.g., Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages
Measurement “Anomie,” 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 310 (1989) (proposing “guidelines
[that] would inform juries of the value for pain and suffering assigned by a large number of
juries to injuries similar to those before the factfinder”). An estimation method similar to
schedules is “comparability analysis,” which is based on the idea of using information about
prior similar cases as a guidance rule. See, e.g., Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case
Guidance in the Determination of Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages, 85
U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2017) (defining comparable-case guidance and concluding that it
reduces unpredictability and “improves[s] the accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and
punitive damages generally by allowing for the sharing of relevant information across cases”);
cf. Hillel J. Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case Guidance on Awards for
Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 37
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 408 (2019) (“[T]here is strong evidence that prior-award
information reduces the unpredictability of damage awards while also introducing the
possibility of biasing the awards.”).
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damages based on defined categories that describe different levels
of injury severity and prior awards for the injuries within each
category.93 The schedules approach has been criticized for the
complexity that it brings into the already challenging process of
evaluating pain and suffering damages, which are typically
idiosyncratic and hard to compare.94 Systems based on matrices
classify injuries mostly according to their severity level as a key to
valuing pain and suffering losses.95 Although the matrices approach
is less restrictive than the schedules approach, it has also been
criticized for its complexity and administrative costs96—as well as
for its failure to address the basic inquiry for which it was formed,
i.e., “how one should initially assess the value of pain-and-suffering
damages.”97 Indeed, it is not clear how the categories that best
express the right amount of damages for pain and suffering loss can
be determined without first answering this threshold question.98

93 See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 791 (“The jury or reviewing court determines where the
plaintiff’s injury falls on the schedule, and the schedule provides a range or specified amount
that can be binding or nonbinding on juries or courts.”).
94 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 920 (“The best available single predictor of award
amount is the severity of injury . . . .”). Another problem of schedules is their dependence on
past awards, which may lead to replicating previous assessment errors. See Geistfeld, supra
note 8, at 791–92 (noting that “prior awards for injuries within each category [of the schedule]
provide a range of damages amounts” and “[t]his reliance upon past awards . . . represents
the most problematic aspect of . . . reform proposals” because it can ensure that juries repeat
past mistakes).
95 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 939–53 (proposing a matrix that defines the severity of
injury by determining whether it is permanent or temporary and major or minor). Another
key factor suggested for evaluating pain and suffering damages is the plaintiff’s age. See id.
at 941 (explaining that although young people are expected to recover faster from temporary
pain and suffering injuries, they suffer more from permanent injuries because their life spans
are longer). Alternatively, a more open-ended matrix would present few standardized injury
scenarios for the jurors to choose from, each describing a different physical injury and severity
level with corresponding monetary awards. Id. at 953–56 (observing that the monetary values
attached to the scenarios in a proposed matrix would be “advisory rather than mandatory,”
allowing jurors flexibility to select “intermediate amounts between the scenario levels”).
96 See Avraham, supra note 10, at 103 (noting that even a “simple” matrix creates high
levels of variance among injury-severity types and thus comparable problems of cost and
administration).
97 Id. at 104.
98 Cf. Chase, supra note 8, at 765 (explaining that jurors must monetize pain and suffering
based on their own subjective standards given a lack of any “‘absolute’ standard” by which to
calculate pain and suffering damages).
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A different approach intended to address this question asks the
jury to consider the amount that a reasonable person would have
paid ex ante to eliminate the risk that caused the plaintiff’s pain and
suffering.99 This framework, commonly referred to as the
“willingness to pay”100 approach, similarly seeks to facilitate the
determination of “the appropriate relationship between the severity
of the plaintiff's injury and the amount of . . . compensation for that
injury.”101 Like the previously described approaches, the willingness
to pay approach asks jurors to estimate the severity of the plaintiff’s
injury, only this time from the perspective of a reasonable person:
they must estimate how the plaintiff would have assessed the
severity of her injury ex ante, and accordingly, how much she would
have been willing to pay to eliminate the risk of its occurrence.102
As this brief review shows, severity of injury is generally used to
evaluate pain and suffering damages103 and is, in essence, “the item
for which pain-and-suffering damages compensate.”104 Despite its
centrality, severity of injury is highly obscure and difficult to
evaluate objectively.105 I return to this point later when I explain
See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 804–10 (proposing an “ex ante full-compensation award”
that includes the amount the consumer would be willing to pay to eliminate the risk of
incurring the injury). This idea has also been criticized for its administrative complexity and
costs and potential to distort deterrence by overcompensating victims. See, e.g., Avraham,
supra note 10, at 106–08 (describing various potential disadvantages of Geistfeld’s ex ante
approach).
100 Avraham, supra note 10, at 106.
101 Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 814.
102 See Avraham, supra note 10, at 106–08, 110 (“Another approach . . . is to ask the jury to
assess how much a rational individual would have paid ex ante to eliminate the risk that
caused the pain-and-suffering loss.”).
103 See, e.g., Yun-chien Chang, Theodore Eisenberg, Tsung Hsien Li & Martin T. Wells,
Pain and Suffering Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An Empirical Study, 14 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 199, 205 (2017) (“Our first conjecture, based on discussions with dozens of
judges in all three levels of courts in Taiwan, is that judges consciously base the amount of
pain and suffering damages on the severity of injury.”); Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart &
Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges,
and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 760–61 (1999) (showing that subjective assessments of
severity of injury account for 61% the variance in damages awards); Bovbjerg et al., supra
note 44, at 920, 941 (identifying the severity of injury as “[t]he best available single predictor”
for pain and suffering damages).
104 Avraham, supra note 10, at 114.
105 See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 781 (“[T]here is no objective test that measures the
severity of the victim’s pain-and-suffering injury.”); see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at
99
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that the concept of severity creates a loophole through which
extralegal factors such as race and gender considerations can
infiltrate the evaluation of pain and suffering damages.106
At this juncture, I want to draw attention to two so-called “equity
scales” pertaining to pain and suffering damages and the severityof-injury inquiry107: “vertical equity,” which expresses the idea that
plaintiffs who suffer more severe injuries should receive higher
damage awards,108 and “horizontal equity,” according to which
injuries with similar levels of severity should be compensated
alike.109 While the state of vertical equity is generally perceived as
“rather good,”110 meaning that “more severe injuries tend to receive
higher awards,”111 horizontal equity is perceived as deficient
because similarly severe injuries are still often awarded
disproportionately.112 Accordingly, scholars have shifted their
attention to the challenges of estimating the severity-of-injury
factor primarily through the lens of horizontal equity.113
I suggest that the scholarship’s focus on resolving horizontal
equity is at least partly responsible for allowing implicit racial bias
to infiltrate the estimation of pain and suffering damages. The
problem with implicit racial bias is that it may disrupt the
evaluation of severity of injury in one’s mind, thus making a juror
genuinely believe that a Black victim’s injury is less severe than it
actually is. When people evaluate equally severe injuries differently,
they compromise both vertical and horizontal equity. Racially
920–21 (noting that the affiliation of the suffering to physical injury, the injury’s permanence,
and whether the injury is minor or major as some factors that scholars have suggested to
evaluate the severity of pain and suffering); Avraham, supra note 10, at 112 (stating that the
medical costs associated with the required treatment for the injury may also correlate to pain
and suffering damages).
106 See infra notes 123–129, 157–164 and accompanying text.
107 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 179–80 (pointing out the centrality of
severity of injury in both vertical and horizontal equality).
108 See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 924 (defining vertical equity as “the fairness
between separate categories of injury”); Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 784 (“[P]laintiffs who suffer
more severe injuries tend to receive higher awards (indicating some degree of ‘vertical
equity’) . . . .”).
109 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
110 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 924.
111 Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 784.
112 Id. at 784–85.
113 See supra notes 44–46.
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disparate perceptions of severity of injury allow injuries with
different levels of severity to receive similar awards,114 thus
disrupting vertical equity, and allow similarly severe injuries to
receive different awards, thus disrupting horizontal equity.115
Implicit bias influences both scales of equity because it concerns
the qualitative process of thinking about the severity of injury,
rather than the quantitative description of the harmful effects of
that injury.116 The approaches to measuring pain and suffering
damages described above concentrate only on the latter issue, trying
to estimate the effects of the injury on the plaintiff. These
approaches thus leave aside the problems associated with jurors’ (as
well as healthcare providers’) subjective views of the injury’s
harmful effects on the plaintiff. Yet, this is exactly where implicit
bias lies.
B. THE COLOR OF PAIN

This section explains how racial bias infiltrates pain and
suffering damages from two different, yet connected, sources: jurors’
and healthcare providers’ evaluations of the severity of the
plaintiff’s injury.
1. Racial Bias in Jurors’ Assessments. For centuries, racist beliefs
have attributed fundamental biological differences to Black and
White people.117 Indeed, myths such as “Black skin is thicker than
White skin,”118 which imagines that Black people have greater
For example, in the hypothetical above, as a result of racial bias, the Black plaintiff’s
award (if she gets one) would be 6, whereas a White plaintiff would receive 6 for a less-severe
injury.
115 For example, as the hypothetical above demonstrates, two plaintiffs with identical
injuries can get different damage awards (6 ≠ 10) because of racial bias.
116 Cf. Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 785 (“The possibility that jurors rely on extralegal factors
such as gender, race, socioeconomic status, or physical appearance is a significant concern,
particularly since studies have shown that such factors become more influential in jury
decision-making when the legal standards are the most ambiguous.”).
117 See Kelly M. Hoffman, Sophie Trawalter, Jordan R. Axt & M. Norman Oliver, Racial
Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological
Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4296, 4297 (2016)
(“Beliefs that blacks and whites are fundamentally and biologically different have been
prevalent in various forms for centuries.”).
118 See, e.g., JOHN BROWN, SLAVE LIFE IN GEORGIA: A NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE, SUFFERINGS,
AND ESCAPE OF JOHN BROWN, A FUGITIVE SLAVE, NOW IN ENGLAND 47–48 (L.A. Chamerovzow
114
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resistance to pain than White people, are still common119—although
they tend to be hidden in what some might view at first glance as
“innocuous” or “benevolent” beliefs, such as those attributing
superior athletic capabilities and greater strength to Black
people.120 These beliefs express what psychologists define as
“infrahumanization,” meaning “that people tend to perceive outgroup members as less human than in-group members,”121 even if
that means associating them with superhuman capacities.122

ed., 2d ed. 1855) (documenting Dr. Thomas Hamilton’s horrific experiments on John Brown,
which were motivated by the belief that Black skin was thicker than White skin).
119 See, e.g., Hoffman et al., supra note 117, at 4297–98 (finding that participants in a study
who rated “high” in false racial beliefs rated the pain of Black individuals lower and the pain
of White individuals higher than participates who rated “low” in false beliefs, indicating that
“relative to participants low in false beliefs, [the participants holding such racial beliefs]
seemed to assume that the black body is stronger and that the white body is weaker”); Sophie
Trawalter, Kelly M. Hoffman & Adan Waytz, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Others’ Pain, 7
PLOS ONE, Nov. 2012, at 1, 1 (finding that “people assume a priori that Blacks feel less pain
than do Whites”); René Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An Institutional Analysis of
Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79, 103 (2001) (observing that “the
unquestioned knowledge that Blacks are biologically and culturally different serves as an
unseen and unquestioned antecedent” to forming patterns or practices in highly formalized
settings, such as the biomedical community); Thompson, supra note 25, at 1244 (“Social
science research has made clear that a majority of Americans carry some level of subconscious
or implicit bias against racial minorities and that this bias manifests itself in the application
of racial stereotypes.”).
120 See, e.g., Waytz et al., supra note 17, at 352 (finding that “Whites preferentially attribute
superhuman capacities to Blacks versus Whites”); D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX, AND
SUSPICION: THE MYTH OF THE BLACK MALE 139 (2005) (“Ideas about the ‘natural’ physical
talents of dark-skinned peoples, and the media-generated images that sustain them, probably
do more than anything else in our public life to encourage the idea that blacks and whites are
biologically different in a meaningful way.”); Catherine A. Cottrell & Steven L. Neuberg,
Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach
to “Prejudice”, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 770, 770 (2005) (stating that “African
Americans are [stereotyped as] noisy, athletic, and ‘hav[ing] an attitude’”); Patricia Vertinsky
& Gwendolyn Captain, More Myth than History: American Culture and Representations of the
Black Female’s Athletic Ability, 25 J. SPORT HIST. 532, 533–34 (1998) (tracing the construction
and perpetuation of the myths about Black women athletes and their abilities in the context
of American culture).
121 Nick Haslam & Steve Loughnan, Dehumanization and Infrahumanization, 65 ANN.
REV. PSYCH. 399, 402 (2014).
122 See Waytz et al., supra note 17, at 352 (finding that “White Americans superhumanize
Black people relative to White people”); Hoffman et al., supra note 117, at 4297 (explaining
that a different prejudiced explanation for attributing Black people superhuman capacities
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At the core of the myth that a Black body is stronger than a White
one lies the belief that Black people experience less pain than White
people.123 This belief has a variety of possible implications. For
example, in examining National Football League injury reports,
researchers found that “injured Black players [we]re deemed more
likely to play in a subsequent game,” relative to injured White
players.124 Other researchers have shown that Black people are
sometimes perceived as better able to suppress hunger and thirst,125
or even to tolerate heat, than White people.126 Researchers have
found discrepancies in evaluating the physical conditions of injured
White and Black people among medical students and professionally
trained residents,127 which I address separately below.128 This raises
the concern that judges and jurors are likewise susceptible to false
racial beliefs. When these racial beliefs are implicit, a judge or juror
might underestimate the severity or the effects of a Black plaintiff’s
injury, all the while being completely convinced that her view is
objective and not biased.129 In such a case, the amount of damages
awarded to a Black plaintiff would be lower than she actually
deserves.
The possible effects of implicit bias on jurors’ decision-making
have been extensively explored in the literature130 and are reflected
is that “black people are better athletes—stronger, faster, and more agile—as a result of
natural selection and deliberate breeding practices during slavery”).
123 See Hoffman et al., supra note 117, at 4297–98 (finding that when participants in a
study were asked to rate the pain of a gender-matched Black or White target across the same
scenarios, participants who rated the Black target reported lower pain estimates than
participants who rated the White target and that participants with higher levels of false
racial beliefs rated the Black target’s pain even lower).
124 Trawalter et al., supra note 119, at 1–2 (examining NFL players’ injury reports from
two seasons and concluding that Black injured players were rated as more likely to play in
the next game than White players, controlling for age, experience in NFL, position, and injury
type).
125 Waytz et al., supra note 17, at 5.
126 Hoffman et al., supra note 117, at 4297.
127 Id. at 4298–99.
128 See infra notes 148–153 and accompanying text.
129 See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 386–87 (2007) (suggesting that racial memory encoding
may lead to “cognitive errors such as framing effects” and “decision-making problems”); infra
notes 136–142, and accompanying text.
130 See e.g., Levinson, supra note 129, at 406 (“The results of the empirical study, combined
with existing research on implicit social cognition and memory, lead to the conclusion that
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in existing procedures and practices intended to confront these
unwanted effects before trial (e.g., peremptory challenges),131
during the trial (e.g., the process of jury deliberation as a group132
and the use of jury instructions133), and in the final decision stage
implicit [racial] memory biases most likely operate in legal decisionmaking.”); Cardi et al.,
supra note 7, at 550 (focusing on the influence of implicit bias on tort litigation and concluding
that Black plaintiffs were awarded lower damage awards than White plaintiffs); Thompson,
supra note 25, at 1297–1300 (suggesting reform in voir dire and jury instructions to contend
with implicit racial bias in criminal litigation); McCaffery et al., supra note 30, at 1347–87
(investigating implicit bias in the context of pain and suffering losses, particularly
concentrating on the connection between the framing of jury instructions and the monetary
awards in these cases).
131 Peremptory challenges enable the parties to eliminate potential jurors from either side
of the legal dispute to secure impartiality in a trial. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (“In civil cases,
each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b) (“The court
must allow the number of peremptory challenges provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1870.”). But
peremptory challenges are often ignored in civil trials. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, Modeling
the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 377, 380 n.11 (2010) (analyzing peremptory challenges in criminal cases because “most
of the controversy about peremptory challenges concerns their use in criminal cases”). Even
scholars and judges have questioned the effectiveness of peremptory challenges. See, e.g.,
Joshua Revesz, Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge, 125 YALE
L.J. 2535, 2535 (2016) (“Allowing parties to unilaterally strike prospective jurors without
explanation has been attacked as undemocratic, as prone to manipulation, as a potential First
Amendment violation, and—most often of all—as racist. Judges and even prosecutors have
spoken out against the procedure.” (footnotes omitted)); Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle,
Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process
in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1182–97 (2003) (“The research we review below
indicates that limited voir dire, as it is practiced in many United States jurisdictions, is not
effective in identifying and vetting jurors with relevant experiences and attitudes.”); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 163–70 (1989) (“Peremptory challenges
ensure the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially
advancing the goal of making juries more impartial.”).
132 Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2406–08 (1990). Wells notes that in order to
eliminate individuals’ bias among the jury, the jurors sit together throughout the trial
“enclosed in a box,” “retire to the privacy of a jury room” to deliberate, and are overall
physically isolated from the outside world. Id. Wells also emphasizes the importance of jurors
engaging in mutual discussion amongst themselves, which leads to what she identifies as
collective, rather than aggregative, decision-making (i.e., a judgment that transcends
individual viewpoint). Id.
133 See, e.g., WASH. STATE SUP. CT. COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 6 WASHINGTON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL WPI 1.01 (7th ed. 2019) (“It is important that you discharge your
duties without discrimination, meaning that bias regarding the race, color, religious beliefs,
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(e.g., reducing the required number of assenting jurors).134 These
procedures and practices, however, are mostly designed to contend
with explicit forms of bias. And indeed, although explicit racial bias
has not been eliminated, expressions of prejudice have become
considerably less common in the courtroom.135
And yet, studies reveal that even when explicit racial bias is
appropriately treated, implicit racial bias lingers. For example,
participants in a study on implicit bias and memory errors
systematically misremembered relevant case facts in a racially
biased manner that harmed Black litigants.136 Interestingly, the
participants who showed greater memory bias against Black
litigants were not found to be more likely to be explicitly biased.137

national origin, sexual orientation, gender, or disability of any party, any witnesses, and the
lawyers should play no part in the exercise of your judgment throughout the trial. These are
called ‘conscious biases’– and, when answering questions, it is important, even if
uncomfortable for you, to share these views with the lawyers.”). For a discussion about using
jury instructions as means for reducing racial bias, see generally, Thompson, supra note 25
(suggesting that courts make racial bias “salient at trial” by improving jury instructions so
that they address both conscious and unconscious stereotypes); Suzanne Mannes, Elizabeth
E. Foster & Shana L. Maier, Jury Instructions: How Timing, Type and Defendant Race Impact
Capital Sentencing Decisions, 14 APPLIED PSYCH. CRIM. JUST. 154, 157–68 (2018) (discussing
different methods for conveying the instructions to the jury to reduce potential bias, and
finding that the timing of providing the instructions significantly impacts juror bias); Chase,
supra note 8, at 766–68 (discussing jury instructions such as those directing the jurors to use
their “collective enlightened conscience[s]” or to determine the sum of recovery “justly and
fairly,” arguing that this type of terminology is too vague and thus only introduces more
confusion to the jury’s open-ended task of evaluating the plaintiff’s pain and suffering).
134 See, e.g., HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 213 (1996)
(noting that most states “permit nonunanimous verdicts in civil cases”); Wells, supra note
132, at 2407 (explaining that jury decisions may eliminate or at least limit the impact of
individual opinion). It should be noted, however, that eliminating the impact of the minority
may actually fail to achieve this goal when the minority balances against a biased decision.
See, e.g., Michael H. Glasser, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts
in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 676–77 (1997) (suggesting a plan that would
help ensure that the jurors in the majority will not ignore the arguments of jurors in the
minority once the majority attains the requisite number of assenting jurors).
135 See Su, supra note 20, at 79–80 (explaining that “although not all explicit biases have
been eliminated in all the courts, they are now no longer at the forefront of issues that courts
address since many mechanisms have been put in place to prevent such issues” (footnote
omitted)).
136 See Levinson, supra note 129, at 398–406.
137 Id. at 404 (“[P]articipants who manifested more memory bias were not more likely to be
explicitly biased.”).
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Moreover, the study results revealed an alarming fact: some of the
participants who showed lower levels of explicit bias were actually
found to be more racially biased than participants who showed
higher levels of explicit bias.138 These results are consistent with
evidence that people, including judges,139 have discovered after
taking an Implicit Association Test140: although they were certain
of their neutral and unbiased opinions, they were in fact
unconsciously biased against Black people.141 This evidence is
especially disturbing considering that research has shown that
implicit bias is not only much harder to detect than explicit bias, but
also much harder to control.142
Naturally, most of the existing research on implicit racial bias
among jurors focuses on its detrimental implications in the context
of criminal litigation, where juror prejudice may result in the
deprivation of an innocent defendant’s freedom.143 The focus on the
criminal arena has left the field of tort law neglected and more
exposed to the negative influences of implicit racial bias. This is
especially troubling in light of recent research on implicit racial bias
in tort litigation, which revealed that people tend to award Black
plaintiffs lower damage awards than White plaintiffs, both in
general and with respect to pain and suffering damages

138 Id. (noting instances where people with scores indicating less explicit racism were more
likely to demonstrate racial bias than those with higher scores).
139 Recently retired Judge Mark W. Bennet of the United States District Court in the
Northern District of Iowa shared his experience of taking the Implicit Association Test and
learning that he had “very high implicit bias against African Americans.” See ABA Criminal
Justice Section, Highlights: Judges Explore Implicit Bias, YOUTUBE, at 4:47–4:51 (May 29,
2015)
[hereinafter
Judge
Mark
W.
Bennett
Video],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12TY110t8PY.
140 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is part of Project Implicit based at Harvard
University that aims to “measure[] attitudes and beliefs that people may be unwilling or
unable to report.” PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
141 See Judge Mark W. Bennett Video, supra note 139, at 4:05–5:15 (describing his discovery
of his implicit bias against African Americans in his Implicit Association Test results, even
though he was previously convinced that he was unbiased).
142 Levinson, supra note 129, at 406 (noting that “social scientists have demonstrated that
implicit biases are ‘widespread’ and frequently resistant to intervention”).
143 See infra notes 171–172 and accompanying text (noting that juror bias can have
detrimental effects on a defendant’s freedom).
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specifically.144 Recently, researchers at the University of Oregon
conducted an exploratory analysis on a broad sample of cases and
confirmed these patterns.145 They found that jurors had a tendency
to award Black plaintiffs less in pain and suffering damages than
White plaintiffs.146 Interestingly, they did not find a similar
disparity concerning other minorities.147
2. Racial Bias in Medical Providers’ Assessments. Even in the
optimistic case in which jurors’ implicit racial bias can be identified
and properly contained, it is important to acknowledge the
possibility that healthcare providers’ judgments and testimonies, on
which jurors base their decisions, might also be influenced by such
bias. Indeed, studies suggest that false beliefs attributing biological
differences to Black and White bodies, or attributing higher
resistance to pain to Black people, are still present in modern day
medical education and practice.148 These studies suggest that Black
people’s injuries and the effects of those injuries might be
underestimated as compared to the same injuries in White people,
even through the eyes of well-trained healthcare providers.
See supra note 7 (describing how evidence of racial discrepancies in damages cannot be
explained fully by the use of race-based tables or similar statistical data).
145 Girvan & Marek, supra note 7, at 252–53.
146 See id. at 253 (“[H]olding the other variables constant, jurors tend to award black
plaintiffs approximately 41 percent of the amount of pain and suffering damages as white
plaintiffs, controlling for the other predictors.”).
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Hoffman et al., supra note 117, at 4296 (“[A] substantial number of white
laypeople and medical students and residents hold false beliefs about biological differences
between blacks and whites[.] . . . [T]hese beliefs predict racial bias in pain perception and
treatment recommendation accuracy.”); Sophie Trawalter & Kelly M. Hoffman, Got Pain?
Racial Bias in Perceptions of Pain, 9 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 146, 152 (2015)
(“Our findings suggest that one reason black patients may receive less pain medication is that
medical professionals assume black patients feel less pain than do white patients.”); Linda
Villarosa, Myths About Physical Racial Differences Were Used to Justify Slavery – and Are
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2019),
Still
Believed
by
Doctors
Today,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/racial-differences-doctors.html
(“Over the centuries, the two most persistent physiological myths—that black people were
impervious to pain and had weak lungs that could be strengthened through hard work—
wormed their way into scientific consensus, and they remain rooted in modern-day medical
education and practice.”); see also LUNDY BRAUN, BREATHING RACE INTO THE MACHINE: THE
SURPRISING CAREER OF THE SPIROMETER FROM PLANTATION TO GENETICS 198 (2014) (“As
historians have demonstrated repeatedly, social conditions influence scientists and how they
interpret their findings.”).
144
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For example, one study found that Black and Hispanic patients
were less likely than White patients to receive pain-reducing
treatment in ambulance response settings (whereas neither sex nor
age was found to be a significant predictor).149 Racial discrepancies
in pain assessment were even found in children through a study of
nearly one million children diagnosed with appendicitis that
showed that Black children were less likely to receive any pain
medication.150 Racial disparities in healthcare providers’ estimation
of patients’ severity of injury were also found in responses to Black
and White patients in hospital emergency departments,151 as well
as in responses to Black and White patients’ complaints describing
identical symptoms of chest pain152 and knee problems.153

149 See Megann F. Young, H. Gene Hern, Harrison J. Alter, Joseph Barger & Farnaz
Vahidnia, Racial Differences in Receiving Morphine Among Prehospital Patients with Blunt
Trauma, 45 J. EMERGENCY MED. 46, 51 (2013) (“This study suggests that Caucasians . . . are
more likely to receive analgesia for blunt trauma injuries in the prehospital setting. When
adjusted for pain severity and other characteristics, sex and age were not significant factors
in this analysis.”).
150 See Monika K. Goyal, Nathan Kuppermann, Sean D. Cleary, Stephen J. Teach & James
M. Chamberlain, Racial Disparities in Pain Management of Children with Appendicitis in
Emergency Departments, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 996, 998 (2015) (“When stratified by pain
score and adjusted for ethnicity . . . black patients with moderate pain were less likely to
receive any analgesia than white patients.”).
151 See Mark J. Pletcher, Stefan G. Kertesz, Michael A. Kohn & Ralph Gonzales, Trends in
Opioid Prescribing by Race/Ethnicity for Patients Seeking Care in US Emergency
Departments, 299 JAMA 70, 72 (2008) (finding differences in opioid prescriptions for pain
between ethnic minority patients and White patients in hospital emergency departments).
152 Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians’ Recommendations
for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 623 (1999) (finding that patients’
race and sex affected physicians’ decisions about whether to refer the patient for cardiac
catheterization, especially with respect to Black female patients). The researchers used Black
and White actors who described similar symptoms of chest pain. Id. at 619. A videotape of
the patients was then shown to 720 physicians, who were told that they were participating
in a study of clinical decision making. Id. at 619, 621. The researchers did not tell the
physicians that the purpose of the study was to determine the effects of patients’ race (and
sex) on clinical decision making. Id. at 619. For a thorough review of this study, see Bowser,
supra note 119, at 85 n.28 (pointing out that “[b]y using actors and actual physicians in a
controlled environment, the study avoid[ed] some of the methodological issues involved in
adjusting for confounding variables,” such as patients’ income and socioeconomic status, and
observing that, due to racial bias, “equality of health care coverage does not guarantee
equality of medical treatment”).
153 Emma Pierson, David M. Cutler, Jure Leskovec, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad
Obermeyer, An Algorithmic Approach to Reducing Unexplained Pain Disparities in
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Importantly, none of these studies suggests that the healthcare
providers disregarded what they considered severe injuries.154
Instead, the studies imply that the providers, likely unconsciously,
interpreted the Black patients’ injuries to be less severe.155 They
thus demonstrate what Oliver Wendell Holmes observed more than
a century ago: There is a “closer relation between the Medical
Sciences and the conditions of Society and the general thought of
the time, than would at first be suspected.”156 Evidently, implicit
racial bias may distort even well-trained healthcare providers’
assessments of injury severity.
These types of disruptions in assessing Black patients’ severity
of injury cannot be offset by using proxies, such as a minor–major
severity scale157 or a medical costs indicator.158 When a physician
unconsciously underestimates the severity or effects of her Black
patients’ injuries as compared to her White patients’, she may
consequently classify her Black patients’ injuries as more minor on
a minor–major scale. Similarly, the disruptions in assessing Black
patients’ severity of injury may also influence the physician’s
judgment regarding the needed course of treatment, which in turn
translates to lower medical costs. Research supports this
conclusion. Racial discrepancies in treatment have been observed
not only in responses to severe pain of Black versus White
patients,159 but also in Black versus White patients’ admission to

Underserved Populations, 27 NATURE MED. 136, 138–39 (2021) (suggesting the use of
algorithmic predictions to redress racial disparities in treatments for knee problems due to
mistaken measures of severity graded by radiologists).
154 See supra notes 151–153.
155 See, e.g., supra note 62 and accompanying text.
156 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS: 1842–1882, at 177 (1911).
157 See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 44, at 939–41. Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein also offer
to define the level of severity of injury with reference to a permanent–temporary scale. See
id. Even this scale has some gray areas in which there is room for interpretation, though. As
explained above, gray areas are where racial bias can linger. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
158 Avraham, supra note 10, at 110–12 (proposing the use of medical costs of present and
future treatments that the plaintiff’s injury necessitates as a proxy for severity of injury to
determine the appropriate sum for pain and suffering damages and explaining that “larger
economic losses are correlated with higher severity of injury, which in turn is what pain and
suffering is all about”).
159 See supra notes 149–150.
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cardiac care units,160 receipt of heart bypass surgery or coronary
angioplasty,161 dialysis treatments,162 and various other treatments
and hospital services.163 Because implicit racial bias may result in
inferior treatment for Black patients,164 it is reasonable to assume
that the medical costs that this treatment entails—on its face, an
objective indicator for estimating the plaintiff’s pain and suffering
and severity of injury—are also affected by racial bias.
Thus, the approaches to calculating pain and suffering damages
depend, at least to some extent, on jurors’ and healthcare providers’
interpretations of the evidence pertaining to the severity of a
plaintiff’s injury.165 Studies indicate that this interpretation is
160 Tetyana P. Shippee, Kenneth F. Ferraro & Roland J. Thorpe, Racial Disparity in Access
to Cardiac Intensive Care Over 20 Years, 16 ETHNICITY & HEALTH 145, 162 (2011) (“The racial
disparity in access to CCUs [cardiac care units] is clear . . . . We conclude that the chain of
risks leading to CCU admission is distinct for Black and White adults. . . . Black individuals
experience a chain of cultural and economic risks that influence their health care access.”).
161 David M. Carlisle, Barbara D. Leake & Martin F. Shapiro, Racial and Ethnic Disparities
in the Use of Cardiovascular Procedures: Associations with Type of Health Insurance, 87 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 263, 265 (1997) (“The study population underwent . . . 10 604 [sic] coronary
artery bypass graft surgeries, and 9190 [sic] coronary artery angioplasties . . . . Slightly more
than two thirds of the study population consisted of White patients.”).
162 C.M. Kjellstrand & George M. Logan, Racial, Sexual and Age Inequalities in Chronic
Dialysis, 45 NEPHRON 257, 257 (1987) (“[T]here are three times as many blacks on dialysis
per million population as whites in the United States.”).
163 For a survey of some of these discrepancies, see, for example, Graciela J. Soto, Greg S.
Martin & Michelle Ng Gong, Healthcare Disparities in Critical Illness, 41 CRITICAL CARE
MED. 2784, 2787 (2013) (listing racial disparities in clinical management such as care
delivered “before, during, and after [an] ICU stay”; admission “to an ICU from the emergency
department”; receipt of “interventions such as dialysis, tracheostomy, central venous access,
and pulmonary artery catheterization”; and post-ICU discharges of “[n]onwhites with sepsis
and mechanically ventilated African-American patients” to another medical facility or to
long-term acute care hospitals); and John F. Williams, Jack E. Zimmerman, Douglas P.
Wagner, Millard Hawkins & Williams A. Knaus, African-American and White Patients
Admitted to the Intensive Care Unit: Is There a Difference in Therapy and Outcome?, 23
CRITICAL CARE MED. 626, 626–636 (1995) (explaining the significant racial differences in the
frequency of organ transplantation and coronary arteriography surgery).
164 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also Bowser, supra note 119, at 120
(arguing that racial profiling in medicine, which is common, often “leads to errors in
diagnosis, distorted judgments about the appropriate course of treatment, and, ultimately, to
different and inferior medical treatment”); Villarosa, supra note 148 (“The poor health
outcomes of black people, the targets of discrimination over hundreds of years and numerous
generations, may be a harbinger for the future health of an increasingly diverse and unequal
America.”).
165 See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
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systematically disrupted by racial bias, especially toward Black
plaintiffs.166 The latter conclusion is particularly alarming when
considering the ambiguous nature of pain and suffering damages,
which can easily conceal the effects of implicit racial bias.167 Implicit
racial bias disrupts the evaluation of the injury’s severity in people’s
minds, making people believe a Black person’s injury is less severe
than it actually is.168 The approaches to calculating pain and
suffering damages proposed to date focus on severity of injury
without addressing this problem.169 Therefore, they cannot provide
a sufficient antidote to racial bias in this central paradigm of tort
law. In the fourth and final Part of this Article, I introduce a
proposal that can.

IV. EQUALIZING RATIO TABLES
As explained above, the legal system’s current procedures and
practices for contending with juror bias are generally ineffective
when it comes to implicit racial bias.170 For purposes of this last
Part, I wish to draw attention to a different issue, namely that the
current procedures and practices, some of which are particularly
designed to protect defendants’ rights in criminal litigation,171 do
not necessarily meet the needs of minority plaintiffs in tort
litigation.172 In particular, they fail to redress the problem of racial
See supra notes 123–129 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
168 See, e.g., supra notes 148–153.
169 See supra Section III.A.
170 See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text.
171 Cf. Thompson, supra note 25, at 1300 (stating that both voir dire questioning and “jury
instructions on racial bias and stereotypes should be available whenever requested by
minority defendants in criminal cases”); Ford, supra note 131, at 380 n.11 (noting that
peremptory challenges are controversial in criminal cases but usually unused in civil trials);
Su, supra note 20, at 81 (suggesting that “implicit bias education of jurors is critical in order
for a fairer court system—particularly for the criminal justice system”); Rachel E. Barkow,
Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 34 (2003) (“[T]he criminal jury was designed to be part of
our elaborate system of checks and balances, placing a check on the legislature and executive
to ensure that no one received criminal punishment unless a group of ordinary citizens
agreed.”).
172 In fact, the focus on combating implicit bias to protect defendants’ rights in criminal
trials has put also aside the issue of victims of color in criminal trials, who are particularly
166
167
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bias in pain and suffering damages for two main reasons. First, even
assuming that the procedures and practices can eliminate jurors’
own biased judgments about the severity and effects of a plaintiff’s
injury, they cannot reach the “deeper level” of racial bias embedded
in the medical providers’ underlying judgments that influence the
jurors’ assessment. Second, the existing procedures and practices
that aim to contend with juror bias do not directly address a central
element of tort law: the plaintiff’s remedy.
In the next sections, I introduce a solution to racial bias in pain
and suffering damages that is attentive to these essential
requirements.
A. EQUALIZING RATIO TABLES AND EQUALIZING DAMAGES

In this section, I sketch my proposed solution to the problem of
racial bias in pain and suffering damages, which I term Equalizing
Ratio Tables (ERTs). This solution consists of three techniques
specifically designed to eliminate the effects of racial bias in pain
and suffering damages, regardless of the chosen computational
approach.173
For any type of injury, ERTs consist of grids that display the
following174: the average pain and suffering award to White
plaintiffs, (Av(L)); the average pain and suffering award to a
plaintiff belonging to a minority group (Av(Lm)) that, statistics
show, suffers from systematic bias175 affecting the evaluation of pain
susceptible to prejudice in self-defense cases. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1305–06
(suggesting that the jury instructions concerning stereotypes should be given in cases with
Black victims where the defendant argues self-defense).
173 In this Article, I neither address the desirability of the different approaches to
computing pain and suffering damages nor attempt to prioritize them according to different
scales. Instead, I focus on the problem of implicit racial bias that these approaches are not
equipped to resolve.
174 The discussion in this Article focuses on negligence cases; however, ERTs can include
data on equalizing ratios for intentional torts as well.
175 Social psychologists define systematic bias as systematic or orderly deviations from a
normative standard of judgment. Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer,
Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCH. REV. 687, 688 (1996); see
also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1190 (1995)
(stating that inherent bias concerns categorization and related cognitive biases that result in
perpetuating stereotypes).
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and suffering damages;176 and the ratio between these averages,
termed here equalizing ratio.177
The tables may be sorted by additional criteria relevant for
providing accurate data on the effects of racial bias in pain and
suffering damages, such as the plaintiff’s age or the laws of the
jurisdiction governing her claim.178 My intention here is not to
present a definitive list of the categories that ERTs should comprise,
but rather to sketch generally the principle that underlies these
tables. I suggest, however, that the level of detail in ERTs should be
high enough to allow for a sufficiently accurate comparison between
the pain and suffering damages awarded to a minority plaintiff and
a White plaintiff in materially similar cases. And yet, the
granularity of the tables should consider administrative complexity
and cost.179 If the tables are too detailed, jurors—and even judges—
might find them too difficult to use.180 Last, to represent as
176

The tables may thus include a distinct gender category as well.

177

That is

!"($)

.

!"($&)

Most approaches to computing pain and suffering emphasize the importance of age
because, on average, a young person faces more years of suffering ahead than an elderly
person. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 10, at 111 (arguing that age calculations should be
considered in pain and suffering multipliers). Recall that ERTs do not provide a tool for
computing pain and suffering damages, but rather a tool for enabling adjustments of the
computed damages to neutralize the influence of implicit bias. See supra notes 175–177 and
accompanying text. Thus, including age ranges in ERTs only makes sense if age is proven
relevant with respect to racial bias—unless ERTs are used as part of a schedule method for
determining damages, a possibility I address separately below. See infra notes 188–190 and
accompanying text.
179 Some level of administrative complexity and cost is inevitable and is justified to promote
equality and shield the state and its citizens from racism. See Yuracko & Avraham, supra
note 1, at 369 (“While their use might be more administratively complex and costly than the
use of race-based tables, which are more readily accessible, such increased burden does not
shield the state from the obligation to use non-race-based means, when possible.”).
180 See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its
Meaning and Its Effect, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 30 (1994) (noting that some scholars
suggested that “jurors’ problems with complex litigation are not inherent, but rather result
from a failure to present the trial material in an understandable fashion”). For a discussion
of cognitive overload in the context of increasing jurors’ responsibilities, see J.J. Prescott &
Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 301, 335–36. For an article exploring the psychological phenomenon that people
generally become more passive and more susceptible to making wrong decisions when they
face more alternatives to choose from, see Alina Tugend, Too Many Choices: A Problem That
Can Paralyze, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/your178
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accurately as possible the state of racial discrepancies in pain and
suffering damages, the ERTs must be updated on a regular basis.181
ERTs offer three alternative methods for contending with the
effects of racial bias in pain and suffering damages. Under the first
method, once a jury decides a damage award (the “originally decided
damages”), the judge can complement this award by multiplying it
by the relevant equalizing ratio.182 The supplementary damages,
i.e., the sum above the originally decided damages, manifests what
I term here as equalizing damages.183
Importantly, to reveal the accurate extent of racial discrepancies
in jurors’ assessments of pain and suffering damages, the ERTs
must reflect the average amounts awarded to Black plaintiffs before
any equalizing corrections are made. Additionally, the ERTs must
be updated on an ongoing basis so that the averages that they
present reflect data from recently decided cases. To ensure that
these technical, yet essential, requirements are met, courts must
include both the originally decided damages (i.e., without the
equalizing factor) and the total damages award that includes the
equalizing damages in their published decisions.

money/27shortcuts.html. For a discussion how multiple treatment alternatives impact
patients’ decision-making, see Maytal Gilboa & Omer Y. Pelled, The Costs of Having (Too)
Many Choices: Reshaping the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 371
(2019) (studying the influence of multiple treatment alternatives on patients’ wellbeing in the
context of informed consent, noting that “[t]he more complex a decision, the more resources a
patient must invest in making it,” and arguing that “[a]t a certain point, the patient might
reach the limits of these resources, which may lead her to choose mistakenly the wrong
alternative for her”).
181 For a discussion of the tables’ updating mechanism, see infra p. 691.
182 Currently, courts are used to lowering the decided amounts of damages by using either
a remittitur process or an adjustment to statutory caps. Avraham, supra note 10, at 91. The
proposals in this Article suggest adding procedures that allow for increasing rather than
decreasing pain and suffering damages awards, based on the equalizing ratio. Infra pp. 692–
93.
183 It should be noted that when damages are capped, the proposed multiplier method can
only apply within the range below the cap. Where equalizing damages exceed the cap, they
may be nullified. Such cases will further highlight the detrimental impact of damage caps on
minority groups. Cf. Avraham, supra note 1, at 99 (noting that caps present problems for
“[l]ow-income people, especially the unemployed . . . whose loss-of-income component in the
total damage awards is null”). For a brief review of the difficulties that the cap policy entails,
see supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
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The use of ERTs in a multiplier method is especially relevant to
discretionary legal systems.184 Used in this way, ERTs offer a
mechanism for eliminating the expected influence of racial bias on
pain and suffering damages while maintaining the jurors’ freedom
to employ their discretion regarding the desired damages in light of
the evidence.185 The discretionary approach makes sense
considering that two plaintiffs are never exactly the same
(regardless of the influence of racial bias).186
To illustrate the ERTs’ multiplier method, assume that based on
the evidence, a jury decides to award a Black plaintiff who lost her
leg in a car accident $60k for her pain and suffering. Assume further
that according to the information displayed in the ERTs, in
materially similar injury cases, Av(L) = $100k, Av(Lm) = $80k and
thus the equalizing ratio is 1.25.187 Under these circumstances, if
the court decides to use the multiplier, the total damages for pain
and suffering would stand at $75K, and therefore the equalizing
damages would be $15K.
An alternate use of ERTs would be to incorporate the tables’ data
as part of a system of (binding or non-binding) schedules. In this
remedial option, the pain and suffering damages award for the
minority plaintiff is determined according to evidence on prior
awards to White plaintiffs for similarly severe injuries.188 In a
method that uses ERTs in a schedule system, the Black plaintiff in
the illustration above should be awarded $100k in damages—that
is, the average amount of pain and suffering damages awarded to
184 See Chase, supra note 8, at 786–87 (distinguishing between discretionary and binding
schedule systems of computing damages by noting that “more inclusive categories can be
tolerated” in the former).
185 See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 10, at 118 n.138 (explaining that non-binding multipliers
“enable the jurors to respond to idiosyncratic cases and preserve their authority to exceed
even the amount governed by multipliers”); see also People v. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d 846, 850
(N.Y. 2001) (noting that jurors’ life experience “is precisely [the] experience that enables a
jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the strength of arguments”).
186 See, e.g., McCaffery et al., supra note 30, at 1405 (“There is no reason to expect the same
answer in all cases—indeed, one of the great contributions of cognitive decision theory is to
put us on guard against this fallacy—and general tort and moral theory might in fact suggest
grounds for different answers.”).
187

If 𝐴𝑣(𝐿) = 100𝐾 and 𝐴𝑣(𝐿𝑚) = 80𝐾, then
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= 1.25.

For a brief review of additional aspects of the schedules approach, see supra notes 91–
94 and accompanying text.
188
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White plaintiffs for the same type of injury—regardless of the
particular circumstances of the case. Thus, in contrast to the
multiplier method, incorporating ERTs in a schedule system would
leave considerably less room for jurors to exercise discretion in
response to the idiosyncratic facts of the case.189 This, in turn, may
affect the accuracy of the damage award as well.190 For these
reasons, I find the schedules approach inferior to the multiplier
method suggested above. Still, the schedule approach remains
superior to the current situation, which enables racial discrepancies
in pain and suffering damages to persist.
The third use of ERTs is as a valuable informative or educational
tool. In this use of ERTs, the tables should be handed to jurors at
the close of the evidence, along with jury instructions warning them
about the possibility that their decision might be affected by racial
prejudice.191 Jury instructions have been particularly recognized for
their potential use as an educational tool,192 conveying to the jurors
that their decision might be biased, even if they are unaware of their
biases.193

See supra note 184.
For a general criticism of the schedules approach, see supra notes 91–94 and
accompanying text; Avraham, supra note 10, at 101–06 (discussing criticisms of schedules
from various scholars and issues with their proposals for reform, arguing that “the problem
with [schedules] lies more on administrative and deterrence grounds”); and Bovbjerg et al.,
supra note 44, at 964–65 (detailing the strengths and weaknesses of different forms of
scheduling).
191 It was recently suggested that jury instructions should mention well-known stereotypes
to more effectively warn the jurors of biases that may affect their core functions, such as
determining damage awards. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1245 (“[T]he first step in
ridding the jury system of racial bias is to tell the truth about the prevalence and effect of
bias. This includes naming the stereotypes that are at play whenever a person of color enters
a courtroom.”). In tort cases involving pain and suffering loss, jury instructions may
accordingly mention false beliefs pertinent to the particular claim, such as attributing greater
resistance to pain to Black people.
192 See id. at 1300–06 (suggesting ways to improve the instructions’ effectiveness by
providing more information on common stereotypes and generally addressing the issue of
implicit bias more directly and openly).
193 See supra note 130. For an example of jury instructions that address implicit bias, see,
for example, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CACI no. 113 (2020):
Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of
other people. We may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not
189
190
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By exposing data on discrepancies in pain and suffering
damages, the tables provide jurors with concrete evidence of the
consequences of racial bias, thus reinforcing the generic reminder
in the jury instructions about the possible influence of racial bias.194
ERTs may thus contribute to educating jurors about the
detrimental effects of racial bias on Black plaintiffs (as well as other
minority groups subject to systematic discrimination) in pain and
suffering damages.195
In addition, following their exposure to the tables, the jurors may
decide to adjust their evaluation of damages to account, at least to
some extent, for racial discrepancies in pain and suffering
damages.196 The problem with this use of the ERTs is that
“freestyle” adjustments would make it difficult to update the ERTs
properly. For the tables to reflect the actual state of racial
discrepancies in pain and suffering damages, they must take into
account the damages awarded by the jury before any addition of
equalizing damages. Otherwise, when updated, the tables might
give the false impression that the racial discrepancies significantly
narrowed, when in fact they did not. Unlike the multiplier
share them with others. We may not be fully aware of some of our other
biases.
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably, toward
someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we see and
hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make important decisions.
194 See Su, supra note 20, at 99 (noting the importance of a final reminder to the jurors “on
paper,” cautioning them to leave out biased beliefs).
195 Research indicates that educational tools might reduce the effects of racial bias among
white jurors, at least to some extent. See, e.g., Ellen S. Cohn, Donald Bucolo, Misha Pride &
Samuel R. Sommers, Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial
Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1953, 1957 (2009) (finding that the effects of racial
prejudice among White jurors can be reduced by reminding them that their actions could be
interpreted as racist); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 597, 601 (2006) (finding that emphasis on racial issues at trial can reduce the
influence of racial bias on White jurors’ judgments); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, White Jurors’ Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the
American Courtroom, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 203 (2001) (“Run-of-the-mill trials of
Black defendants in which racial issues are not obvious are more likely to elicit prejudicial
responses from Whites.”).
196 In this case, the amount added to the originally decided damages also expresses a form
of equalizing damages upon which the jurors agreed without limiting themselves to the
equalizing ratio or any other guidance.
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approach, which facilitates observation of the measure of racial bias
at work in each case because it precisely shows the ratio necessary
to correct the jury’s original award and achieve parity with awards
in similar cases brought by White plaintiffs,197 “freestyle” use of
ERTs does not reveal that measure. It is doubtful that this problem
can be resolved. First, it is unlikely that jurors could distinguish,
even in their own minds, the damages prior to the adjustment for
racial discrepancies from the damages after the adjustment. That
means that, in time, the tables will not accurately represent the
actual racial discrepancies in pain and suffering damages. Second,
even if this difficulty could be resolved, jurors who know that two
damages awards will be published, one before and one after the
equalizing adjustment, may be reluctant to make any adjustments
at all out of fear of admitting, even to themselves, that they hold
racially biased views. These are serious technical flaws that may
disqualify the third proposed use of the tables, which is therefore
inferior to the multiplier and schedule uses suggested above.
Finally, but importantly, I am aware that ERTs, even in their
optimal, remedial multiplier usage, entail some problems beyond
the above-mentioned difficulties.198 In particular, there are four
types of problematic reactions that the tables, and what they
represent, may invoke in both jurors and judges. First, and
particularly relevant to the multiplier usage of ERTs, is that some
jurors who know that the court multiplies their decided damages by
the equalizing ratio might seek to correct for the anticipated
enhancement by awarding lower damages.199 As a result, the racial
gap, as manifested by the equalizing ratio, will persist in the
updated versions of the ERTs.200 A second possible reaction,
relevant to all three uses of ERTs,201 is that jurors and judges may
reject the idea of awarding equalizing damages on the belief that
See supra notes 183‒186 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179‒181 and accompanying text.
199 For a discussion regarding how knowledge that damages are subject to limits or
alteration can affect juries, see Michael S. Kang, Don’t Tell Juries About Statutory Damage
Caps: The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 486 (1999) (“When a jury ‘guesses’
that the statutory cap will apply to its damage award and speculates that the cap is set at a
certain figure, jury speculation already biases deliberation significantly . . . .”).
200 That is, the equalizing ratio will never converge to one.
201 This reaction is relevant to the uses of ERTs unless the multiplier or schedule usages
are embraced in binding forms.
197
198
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they are completely unnecessary under their watch.202 In that case,
they might be reluctant to use ERTs in any remedial form. A third
problematic reaction is what psychologists define as a “backlash”
toward minorities.203 Following the introduction of these tables,
some jurors and judges might experience anger or resentment
because they may think that Black plaintiffs are actually seeking to
win higher damages that they do not deserve by “playing the ‘race
card.’”204 In these trying times of “fake news” and conspiracy
theories, some jurors might even think that ERTs are completely
made up and do not provide true data.205 The fourth worry is that
ERTs may actually “plant[] the seeds of prejudice where they do not
already exist.”206 People who do not harbor racial bias might
paradoxically begin to feel race-based resentment after their
202 See Su, supra note 20, at 99 (“People may feel that they do not have explicit biases and
by telling them they have implicit biases, when they might not really understand the nature
of the topic, would make them defensive.”).
203 See, e.g., Benjamin G. Bishin, Thomas J. Hayes, Matthew B. Incantalupo & Charles
Anthony Smith, Opinion Backlash and Public Attitudes: Are Political Advances in Gay Rights
Counterproductive?, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 625, 626 (2016) (“Backlash has traditionally been
described as a reaction by members of dominant groups to any challenge to their sense of
importance, influence, values, or status in which they seek to reverse or stop change through
political means.”); Laurie A. Rudman, Richard D. Ashmore & Melvin L. Gary, “Unlearning”
Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 856, 857 (2001) (reviewing findings of backlash reactions to pro-Black
standards).
204 See, e.g., Katherine M. Bell, “This Is Not Who We Are”: Progressive Media and Post-Race
in the New Era of Overt Racism, 12 COMMC’N CULTURE & CRITIQUE 1, 3 (2019) (“Within the
ideology of post-race, also coined as color-blind racism, discussion of racial bias has been
proscribed as playing the ‘race card.’”); Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions
of Fraud and Special Rights Discourse, 53 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1051, 1060–61 (2019) (describing
the view that the demands of minority groups, couched as efforts to achieve equal rights and
an even playing field, are actually attempts to obtain extra benefits); Rudman, supra note
203, at 857 (“[P]eople may perceive a threat to their freedom of expression or be offended by
the implication that they are prejudiced.”).
205 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 204, at 4 (“[P]ost-truth includes the president’s label of ‘fake
news’ to discredit professional news media.”); Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility, 3 INT’L J.
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 54 (2011) (defining “White Fragility” as a mental state of White
people, due to the insulated social environment surrounding White people in North America,
“in which even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intolerable, triggering a range of
defensive moves”).
206 Thompson, supra note 25, at 1303 (describing an objection that “[i]t is quite risky to
introduce specific racial stereotypes to jurors who would have been unaware of them
otherwise” when providing jury instructions on specific racial stereotypes).
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exposure to the tables.207 This potential reaction raises concerns
that ERTs not only fail to eliminate racial bias in damage awards
but also may have unintended harmful consequences for Black
plaintiffs as well.208
My first answer to these contentions is that even if some jurors
will continue to award lower damages in response to the multiplier
use of ERTs because they foresee correction by the court, the use of
ERTs ensures that the damages to minority plaintiffs will be cleared
from the effects of racial bias.209 As I explain in the next section, this
is particularly important to resolve the severe problem of
underdeterrence resulting from racial discrepancies in pain and
suffering damages. Second, any use of ERTs can and should be
supplemented by conventional methods of educating jurors about
the problem of racial bias.210 Explaining to jurors the harmful effects
of racial bias may, in time, reduce the possible resentment toward
using ERTs and generally diminish the occurrence of racial bias in
pain and suffering damages.211 Finally, my general response to all
of the above contentions is that policy changes frequently meet
resistance and backlashes, especially when they disrupt deeply
rooted social standards.212 Yet when core principles of our justice
system are systematically violated—and, as discussed above, the
goals of tort law routinely frustrated—by racial bias hiding in the
shadows of prominent legal determinations such as the

207 Because ERTs contain data that highlight discrepancies in recovery between races,
exposure to this data could be “risky” in the same way that exposing people to stereotypes
“who would have been unaware of them otherwise” would be risky. Id.
208 See id. (describing the argument against introducing stereotypes where they were
otherwise unrecognized because doing so “would be incredibly harmful to [the] ultimate goal
of eliminating racial bias in the justice system”).
209 See supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text. For this outcome to be realized, the
tables must be updated on an ongoing basis to ensure that the data used to calculate the
equalizing ratio is accurate because the ratio is based on average gaps between the amount
of pain and suffering damages awarded to White versus Black plaintiffs.
210 Supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.
211 For studies indicating that juror education might reduce the effects of racial bias among
White jurors to some extent, see supra note 195.
212 See Bishin supra note 203, at 626 (“The idea [of backlash] is that negative reactions to
changes in the status quo are motivated by the attempt to maintain existing power
arrangements. It is therefore unsurprising that most references to backlash examine
minority groups struggling to gain policy.” (citation omitted)).
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quantification of pain and suffering, the need for change must
prevail.
B. THE GOALS OF TORT LAW

Finally, I explore how the proposed ERTs, especially when used
in the multiplier method, advance the goals of tort law discussed in
Section II.B. I begin with the pressing problem of underdeterrence
of torts committed against Black victims.
Recall that racial bias in pain and suffering damages creates an
especially severe problem of underdeterrence for Black plaintiffs
(and possibly other minority plaintiffs) for two related reasons.
First, the open-ended nature of pain and suffering loss is amorphous
enough to hide the racial bias of both the jurors and the healthcare
providers on whose opinions and testimony the jurors rely.213 This
“twofold-bias” can, at least potentially, expand the racial
discrepancy in pain and suffering damages. Second, when it comes
to pain and suffering damages, errors in either awarding damages
or setting the standard of care properly are much harder to
perceive.214 For these reasons, the cost of negligently harming Black
people is significantly lower than the cost of negligently harming
White people, and the problem of underdeterrence is especially
severe.215
In their remedial form, ERTs not only illustrate to jurors and
judges the detrimental effects of implicit racial bias but also provide
an effective and easy-to-use tool for eliminating that bias216 by
213 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Williams J. Hall et. al, Implicit
Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its Influence on Health Care
Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 60, 61, 72–73 (2015) (discussing the
many disparities between health care provider treatment and care of minorities and white
people).
214 Paradoxically, they are easier to reveal in loss of life and limb estimated in terms of loss
of income, for which the damages are based on actuarial tables that consider the plaintiff’s
race and gender. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
215 See supra pp. 667–69.
216 For a discussion of the need for an operative tool to ensure jurors’ understanding of the
consequences of implicit bias, see Su, supra note 20, at 91 (“[E]ven assuming that the jurors
can fully understand the perils of implicit bias as imperative considerations for the case, the
instructions also does [sic] not provide any information to the jurors as to how to apply their
implicit bias training to the case. . . . Implicit bias jury instructions alone are not enough to
combat the full effect of these biases.”).
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adding to the originally decided damages a supplementary amount
of equalizing damages. ERTs’ remedial use therefore enables courts
to raise the cost of negligence toward Black victims to match the
cost of negligence toward White victims that yields similar
injuries.217 This, in turn, would neutralize the problem of
underdeterrence that results from the fact that it is less costly to
harm Black individuals (and, possibly, other minority plaintiffs)
than White individuals.
The remedial use of ERTs also comports with the idea of
corrective justice, which mandates that a victim is compensated by
the tortfeasor for the harm resulting from her negligent behavior.218
The compensation restores the plaintiff to her pre-accident
condition, thus “making the plaintiff whole again.”219 If minority
plaintiffs are undercompensated due to arbitrary considerations
such as racial bias, the idea of restoring the plaintiff to her preaccident condition is frustrated. By supplementing the amount
needed to fulfill the restorative function of damages, equalizing
damages amend this flaw.
Importantly, equalizing damages do not serve any punitive
function toward the defendant. The supplementary amount added
by equalizing damages serves only to complete the amount to which
the plaintiff is entitled by virtue of her valid claim against the
defendant.220 In this sense, equalizing damages have a
restitutionary function: when a plaintiff’s damage award is reduced
because of jurors’ (and possibly healthcare providers’) mistaken
judgment as a result of racial bias, the defendant who benefits from
the reduced sum of damages is unjustly enriched at the expense of
the plaintiff.221 Equalizing damages thus prevent the defendant’s

217 That is, the Black and White plaintiffs can receive exactly the same amount of damages
for similar types of accidents.
218 See COLEMAN, supra note 75, at 367, 369 (justifying liability for negligence with
corrective justice); see also WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 145–58 (discussing “the immanence of
corrective justice in negligence liability”).
219 See supra note 75.
220 See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 74, at 90 (“The defendant’s breach of duty did not of course
bring to an end the duty with respect to the plaintiff’s right, for, if it did, the duty—absurdly—
would have been discharged by its breach.”).
221 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 47 (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“If a third person makes a payment to the defendant in respect of an asset belonging
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unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff as a result of third
parties’ racial bias.222
Finally, by eliminating racial bias, equalizing damages
effectuate the notion of global fairness, ensuring that people who
suffer similarly severe injuries are treated alike, regardless of
race.223 When disrupted by implicit racial bias, jurors and
healthcare providers may mistakenly assign two identical injuries
different levels of severity without even realizing that they are
doing so. In their minds, the similar injuries are actually different.
This cognitive flaw is especially difficult to contend with through
conventional means alone.224 The supplementary remedial tool that
ERTs provide is therefore necessary to equate Black plaintiffs’ pain
and suffering damages with White plaintiffs’ damages in similar
circumstances and ensure global fairness.

V. CONCLUSION
Pain and suffering damages are probably the remedy most
susceptible to (conscious or unconscious) manipulation. This is
because these damages manifest the most elusive and difficult-todefine type of loss: one that results from pain. In the folds of such
abstract damages, it is particularly difficult, if not impossible, to
identify when errors are made by juries and judges, either in the
measure of damages or in setting the standard of care.
Against this backdrop, recent findings revealing significant
racial discrepancies in pain and suffering damages between Black
and White plaintiffs are especially alarming. Interestingly, the
scholarship has for decades admitted the possibility that racial bias
to the claimant, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment.”).
222 See id. cmt. a (“Payment may be made to the defendant as the result of a third party’s
mistake as to identity or ownership . . . . More significant applications of the rule of [§ 47]
involve payments to which (as between defendant and third-party payor) the defendant has
some sort of entitlement, but to which (as between defendant and claimant) the claimant has
the superior claim.”).
223 See supra note 22.
224 See, e.g., Su, supra note 20, at 90 (“The fair and just trial instructions are not enough to
specifically address implicit biases.”); see also Thompson, supra note 25, at 1244 (noting that
safeguards like voir dire and jury instructions addressing racial bias “must be improved if
they are to assist trial courts in ferreting out juror bias”).
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may successfully hide within the obscure estimation of one’s pain.
Nonetheless, the specific need to eliminate racial bias appears to
have been swallowed up by the “greater mission” of finding a way to
calculate pain and suffering damages reliably and consistently.
Currently, both the common methods used in courts and the
proposals advanced by scholars for calculating pain and suffering
damages share the notion that a central factor in estimating these
damages is the severity of the plaintiff’s injury. This Article does not
deny the significance of the severity-of-injury factor as the best
indicator for estimating pain and suffering loss. Instead, it exhorts
us to pay attention to the fact that this factor is hardly objective.
Black people have suffered from underestimation of the severity of
their injuries for centuries. Recent studies confirm that even trained
healthcare providers, probably without being aware of it, ascribe
lower levels of severity to medical conditions in Black patients than
to identical medical conditions in White patients. This, in turn,
affects the respective treatments offered to Black and White
patients.
The Article explained that the severity-of-injury factor is,
therefore, a loophole through which racial discrepancies in pain and
suffering damages can persist. In particular, the Article identified
the source of these discrepancies between Black and White
plaintiffs in two potential biases: one coming from jurors who may
underestimate Black plaintiffs’ injuries, and another coming from
healthcare providers’ underestimation of Black patients’ medical
conditions. The latter bias is then cast into the evidence upon which
jurors base their decisions, confirming and amplifying the effect of
the jurors’ pre-existing implicit bias.
The conventional avenues for contending with racial bias in the
courtroom are therefore insufficient to address racial discrepancies
in pain and suffering losses. Even in the optimistic case in which
the legal system successfully eliminates racial bias among jurors,
the effects of racial bias on the underlying medical evidence persist.
As a result, pain and suffering loss, a central paradigm of tort law
that makes up a significant part of the total compensatory award,
has become a safe harbor for racial prejudice.
The Article provided a unique analysis that revealed the adverse
implications of racial discrepancies in pain and suffering damages
in light of the goals of tort law. It highlighted a severe problem of
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underdeterrence that results when racial discrepancies render
negligence toward Black people less costly than negligence toward
White people. Under these circumstances, it explained, potential
tortfeasors are generally incentivized to be more cautious around
White people than around Black people. In addition, the Article
explained that racial discrepancies in pain and suffering damages
are inconsistent with corrective justice and the notion of global
fairness.
After explaining the unique features of the problem of racial bias
in pain and suffering damages, and the severe implications of this
problem in light of three dominant goals of tort law, the Article
offered a possible solution: ERTs. These tables can serve not only to
educate jurors and judges about the effects of racial discrepancies
in pain and suffering damages but also to provide three remedial
avenues through which decisionmakers can adjust damage awards
to neutralize the influence of racial bias: (1) an equalizing ratio
multiplier, (2) equalizing ratio-based schedules, and (3) jurors’
“freestyle” adjustment of the damages in light of their exposure to
the ERTs. I sketched each of these potential solutions and
addressed potential difficulties in their implementation. The
discussion of the three possible remedial uses of ERTs to eliminate
racial bias in pain and suffering damages revealed that the
suggested multiplier method is generally superior to the others. The
multiplier technique enables jurors to determine an appropriate
level of damages in accordance with their view of the evidence, on
the one hand, while on the other hand, it allows the court to
neutralize the effects of implicit bias by adjusting those damages
based on the accurate equalizing ratio.
Importantly, if ERTs are updated frequently enough to represent
a relatively accurate account of the state of racial discrepancies in
pain and suffering damages, these tables will also show when these
discrepancies are narrowing, and hopefully, one day, have
disappeared. Until then, ERTs offer a solution that, while
admittedly imperfect, promises to do a better job than the current
system that fails to address the pressing problem of racial bias in
pain and suffering damages and its detrimental implications for
Black people.
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